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A civilian trial ... is held in an atmosphere conducive to the pro-
tection of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the
age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice. O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline,
and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive
system of military justice is too obvious to require extensive discus-
sion .... The inescapable demands of military discipline and obe-
dience to orders cannot be taught on the battlefields; the habit of
immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be
virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection. Chappell v.
Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the United States was deeply committed to a ground
war in Southeast Asia in which the suffering and death was
brought home daily to the American television viewer.1 Distrust of
the military was never higher, as the repeated assertions of the im-
minent collapse of the enemy had apparently been graphically be-
lied a year earlier in the Tet Offensive.2 As a newly elected Presi-
dent pledged to bring "peace with honor" to a war which seemed
amenable to neither, Justice Douglas announced the decision of
the Court in O'Callahan v. Parker.3
In 1983, America was at peace. It had finally honored its Viet-
nam veterans4 and begun the process of rearmament in order to
restore an equitable East-West military balance.5 At a time when
there was martial law in Poland," were Soviet troops in Afghani-
stan,7 and was a Vietnamese puppet regime in Kampuchea," Chief
Justice Burger authored Chappell v. Wallace9 for a unanimous
Court.
O'Callahan v. Parker0 had been among the final decisions of the
Warren Court; Chappell v. Wallace" is among the most recent de-
cisions of the Burger Court. During the fourteen years of the Bur-
ger Court, from O'Callahan to Chappell, there developed a change
of both the tone and the substance of the Supreme Court's atti-
tude toward the military services. Whether in the fields of court-
martial jurisdiction, individual rights, the preconditions to judicial
1. For an account of the reporting of America's first televised war, see D. OBFRDoRrER,
TET! (1971). For a skeptical view of the media's performance during Tet, see W. WESTMoRE-
LAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 325 (1976).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 250-52.
3. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See infra text accompanying notes 15-34.
4. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, a black granite monument inscribed with the names
of American service members killed or missing in action during the Vietnam era, was for-
mally dedicated on Veterans Day, November 11, 1982. Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1982, at
Al, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., The 360 Buck Stops Here, Tim, Feb. 16, 1981, at 8, 10 (discussion of Presi-
dent Reagan's military budget); "Teamwork Makes the Difference," id., Jan. 5, 1981, at 61
(interview with National Security Advisor appointee Richard Allen).
6. See, e.g., Man of the Year: He Dared to Hope, id., Jan. 4, 1982, at 13 (article on Soli-
darity leader Lech Walesa).
7. See H. BRADSHER, AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION 169-255 (1983).
8. See, e.g., W. SHAWCROSS, SmESHOW: ISSINGER, NIXON, AND THE DESTRUCTiON OF CAM-
BOI A 390 (1979).
9. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
10. 395 U.S. 258.
11. 103 S. Ct. 2362.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
review of military activities, or the existence of a constitutional
tort action by a service member against his or her commander, the
Court almost uniformly deferred to the military's exercise of au-
thority over its ranks. Although not necessarily noteworthy in
themselves, the significance of these decisions is that in each case
the Court, armed with substantial Warren Court precedent and a
potentially persuasive rationale, could have decided otherwise.
This article will examine the trend of the Burger Court toward
limiting the avenues of a litigious military member to civilian
courts. The cases beginning with O'Callahan v. Parker,12 and cul-
minating with Chappell v. Wallace,1 3 will be surveyed, with partic-
ular emphasis on the way in which the Court could have decided
each case differently. Thereafter, an attempt will be made to iden-
tify some of the causes, whether in the country, the Court, or the
military, which have contributed to this change. Finally, an at-
tempt will be made to predict the result of what may be the next
military case of the Burger Court.1 4
II. THE COURT AND THE COURT-MARTIAL
A. The Legacy of the Warren Court: O'Callahan v. Parker (1969)
Sergeant James F. O'Callahan of Fort Shafter, Territory of Ha-
waii, was on pass and dressed in civilian clothes when he and a
companion assaulted and attempted to rape a young woman in a
Waikiki beach hotel room. O'Callahan was apprehended and con-
fessed to the offenses, for which he was tried and convicted by
12. 395 U.S. 258.
13. 103 S. Ct. 2362.
14. This article will not consider Burger Court cases which refer to the needs of the mili-
tary, which essentially involve decisions made by civilian policymakers, or which involve
coordinate branches of government. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (in-
volving questions of congressional authority); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352
(1976) (involving decisions on release of information); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (determination of promotion policies); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (concerning questions of standing); Glligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973) (questions of congressional authority); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(determining eligibility for dependents' benefits); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1973) (involv-
ing questions of justiciability); Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972) (concerning technical
considerations in a habeas corpus petition); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(concerning conscientious objector determination). See generally Beans, Sex Discrimination
in the Military, 67 MiL. L. REv. 19 (1975); Ellis, Judicial Review of Promotions, 98 MiL. L.
REv. 129 (1982); Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion,
98 MiL. L. REv. 53 (1982).
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court-martial. 15 The conviction was affirmed within the military
appellate system.1 6
On writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, O'Callahan
challenged the jurisdiction of the military to try him for a nonmili-
tary offense committed while off-post and on pass. He was denied
habeas relief by the district court, 7 and the denial was affirmed by
the Third Circuit."8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
cide the question:
Does a court-martial ... have jurisdiction to try a member of the
Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable
in a civilian court and having no military significance, alleged to
have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus depriving
him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and
trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?19
Having suggestively stated the issue, the Court reversed the de-
cisions below. Writing for five justices, Justice Douglas began his
analysis by noting that "[t]he Fifth Amendment specifically ex-
empts 'cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger' from the
requirement of prosecution by indictment and, inferentially, from
the right to trial by jury. "20 Conversely, should a case be character-
ized as failing to arise in the land or naval forces of the United
States, those constitutional provisions would be fully available to
the service member. Justice Douglas concluded that offenses which
bore no relation to the accused's military duties and which oc-
curred in a jurisdiction where civilian courts in which the rights to
indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury were honored,
were not "service connected" and, therefore, did not fall within the
15. 395 U.S. 258, 259-60.
16. O'Callahan was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge from the service, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for ten years. He appealed to the
Army Board of Review, a panel consisting of three military attorneys, which affirmed his
conviction. A petition for review by the United States Court of Millitary Appeals, a three-
judge panel consisting of civilians, was denied. United States v. O'Callahan, 7 C.M.A. 800
(1957).
17. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd,
390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
18. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395
U.S. 258 (1969).
19. 393 U.S. 822, 822 (1968).
20. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) (em-
phasis in O'Callahan).
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specific exemption of the fifth amendment.2 Consequently,
O'Callahan "could not be tried by court-martial but rather was en-
titled to trial by the civilian courts. '22
As controversial as the holding was considered at the time,2" the
language of the opinion was perhaps a greater shock to the defend-
ers of the military justice system. Justice Douglas, obviously con-
cerned by both the appearance and presumed actuality of com-
mand influence over the supposedly neutral court-martial
personnel, wrote that a "court-martial is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a special-
ized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved. '24 Notwithstanding that a three-member civilian panel
oversees the court-martial system, the Court determined that
"courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."'25 The Court also
cited with approval the quotation: "None of the travesties of jus-
tice perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for mili-
tary law has always been and continues to be primarily an instru-
ment of discipline, not justice. '26
Perhaps this thorough indictment of military justice was neces-
sary to support Justice Douglas' view, for it was not supported by
precedent and language emanating from the Supreme Court. As
21. 395 U.S. at 261.
22. Id. at 274.
23. For example, then Professor of Law at the Duke University Law School and current
Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals, Robinson 0. Everett, wrote that "the majority
opinion in O'Callahan must be viewed as a triumph of abstract concept over practical reali-
ties" and should be promptly overruled. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Mill-
stone in Military Justice?, 1969 DuKE L.J. 853, 867. See also Nelson & Westbrook, Court-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v.
Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction,
"Service Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51 Mn.. L. REV. 41 (1971); Wilkin-
son, The Narrowing Scope of Court-Martial Jurisdiction: O'Callahan v. Parker, 9 WAsH-
BURN L.J. 193 (1970). O'Callahan was praised as well. See, e.g., McCoy, Equal Justice for
Serviceman: The Situation Before and Since O'Callahan v. Parker, 16 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1970).
24. 395 U.S. at 265 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas referred to instances of abuses
detailed before a Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. It did not appear persua-
sive to him that the Court of Military Appeals had reversed the convictions in each case,
thus demonstrating a self-corrective ability within the military justice system as a whole.
See id. at 264 n.5.
25. Id. at 265.
26. Id. at 266 (quoting Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969)).
But see infra text accompanying notes 180-206. For a contrary view of the protections af-
forded a military accused, see Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advan-
tages Over a Civilian Defendant, 51 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1971).
240 [Vol. 18:235
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noted by the dissent, military status alone had heretofore been the
sole predicate for amenability to court-martial jurisdiction. In
Coleman v. Tennessee,"' a case which denied a state jurisdiction to
try a service member of an occupying army following the Civil
War, the Court stated:
As Congress is expressly authorized by the Constitution "to raise
and support armies," and "to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces," its control over the whole
subject of the formation, organization, and government of the na-
tional armies, including therein the punishment of offenses com-
mitted by persons in the military service, would seem to be
plenary. 9
In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,"0 a case which
refused to permit court-martial jurisdiction over civilian depen-
dents accompanying the armed forces overseas, the Court found
that "[t]he test for jurisdiction . . . is one of status, namely,
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person
who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval
Forces .. . "31 Thus, under the Coleman test, Congress had the
constitutional authority to permit the trial by court-martial of ser-
vice members for all offenses, while under the Singleton test, one's
status as a member of the military service was the sole test for
amenability to military jurisdiction. O'Callahan clearly met the lat-
ter requirement.
In O'Callahan, Justice Douglas reached back into British and
American practice in an attempt to justify his result. While con-
ceding that the "practice was not altogether consistent, 3 2 he
found the military courts were loathe to try service members for
other than military offenses and, when such courts-martial did
take place, the convictions obtained for purely civil offenses were
occasionally set aside by the reviewing authority.3 3 The dissent
27. 395 U.S. at 275.
28. 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
29. Id. at 514. The argument that court-martial jurisdiction had historically been based
upon military status alone formed the basis of Justice Harlan's dissent, in which Justices
Stewart and White joined. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 274-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
31. Id. at 240-41 (emphasis added).
32. 395 U.S. at 271.
33. Id. (citing W. WiNTHRop, MtLrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1124 nn.82 & 88 (2d ed.
1896)). Of course, to reach the stage of conviction, jurisdiction would have to have been
19841 241
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took issue with this historical review and added important govern-
mental interests which would tend to justify jurisdiction over even
nonmilitary crimes.3 4 Nonetheless, when the dust had settled, mili-
tary courts-martial had been stripped of subject matter jurisdic-
tion over offenses which lacked a demonstrable service connection.
This denial of jurisdiction, together with the corresponding deroga-
tion of military law and procedures by the majority, was the legacy
of the Warren Court to the United States armed forces.
B. The Burger Court Debuts: Relford v. Commandant (1971)
Less than two years after O'Callahan, the Burger Court was
presented with an opportunity to refine or overrule that decision in
Relford v. Commandant.5 In Relford, the accused was tried and
convicted by court-martial in 1961 for kidnapping and raping two
women on the grounds of Fort Dix and the adjacent McGuire Air
Force Base, New Jersey. After exhausting his military appeals,
Relford sought and was denied habeas corpus relief in the federal
courts.36
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Relford
asserted that the service connection mandated by O'Callahan "de-
mands that the crime itself be military in nature, that is, one in-
volving a level of conduct required only of servicemen and, because
of the special needs of the military, one demanding military disci-
plinary action.' '3 7 Under this view, the admittedly nonmilitary of-
fences of rape and kidnapping, albeit occurring on a military in-
stallation, assume no special military significance; the same
standard of conduct is required of the civilian citizens of the state
found at the outset of the case. For a different view of the history of military court-martial
jurisdiction, see Rice, supra note 23, at 47-54.
34. Justice Harlan noted that military prosecution of service members for both civil and
military offenses served to foster military discipline, to discourage offenses against civilian
society which might tend to bring the services into discredit, and to rehabilitate the soldier
and return him to active duty. 395 U.S. at 274, 281-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover,
relegation of a service member to the custody of civil authorities, even if the accused were
released on bail, would render the soldier incapable of deployment with his military unit. Id.
at 282-83. Some of the justifications for the assertion of military jurisdiction over off-post
offenses advanced by Justice Harlan have recently been echoed by the Court of Military
Appeals. See United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983), discussed in Criminal
Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, Significant Decisions of the Court of
Military Appeals, 1982-1983, 103 MIL. L. REv. 79, 80 (1984).
35. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
36. Id. at 360.
37. Id. at 363.
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of New Jersey, in the courts of which Relford argued that he ought
to have been tried.
The Court, through Justice Blackmun," rejected this argument
and instead offered what one commentator has labeled "an exege-
sis of its O'Callahan decision." 39 Noting that, in O'Callahan, the
offense over which jurisdiction had been denied took place off-post
and "did not involve any question of... the security of a military
post," '4 0 the Court identified twelve factors which had borne on the
issue of the service connection:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied
zone of a foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority
stemming from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military
duties and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty
relating to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case
can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.
One might add still another factor implicit in the others:
12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civil-
ian courts.41
The Court found that factors 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12 tended to
weigh in Relford's favor; factors 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 weighed against
him. 2 The latter factors, however, coupled with the essential, obvi-
ous, historical, and perhaps uniquely military interest4 3 in main-
38. Id. at 355. Justice Blackmun, having been appointed to the Court in late 1969, had
not participated in the O'Callahan decision.
39. Cooper, O'Callahan Revisited: Severing the Service Connection, 76 MIm. L. REv. 165,
165 (1977).
40. Relford, 401 U.S. at 365 (quoting O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273-74).
41. 401 U.S. at 365.
42. Id. at 366-67.
43. The Court acknowledged "[t]he distinct possibility that civil courts, particularly
nonfederal courts, will have less than complete interest, concern, and capacity for all the
cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary authority within its own community." Id. at
1984]
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taining the security of the post for those who occupy it led the
Court to hold that "a serviceman's crime against the person of an
individual upon the base or against property on the base is 'service
connected' within the meaning of that requirement as specified in
O'Callahan."44The Court concluded by expressing its hope that
Relford would eliminate a degree of the confusion fostered by the
sweeping language of O'Callahan.4
It does not strain credulity to suppose that the Court could have
held the other way. A panel that, less than twenty months earlier,
had expatiated at length upon the "travesties"'46 and "retributive
justice '47 practiced under the guise of "so-called military justice ' 48
might well have relegated to the civilian courts Relford's nonmili-
tary and off-duty offenses committed against civilians. It could be
argued that it had been fortuitous that Relford had found his vic-
tims at Fort Dix and not in a town in New Jersey. Indeed, it would
be in the interests of state authorities to prosecute and imprison
this rapist in order to prevent his next attack from occurring
within their bailiwick. Mindful of the criticism of O'Callahan,
cited at length in Relford,4 however, the Court declined to so rule.
The significance of Relford to military court-martial jurisdiction,
however, lies in the concededly nonexclusive listing50 of the factors
that impelled the O'Callahan decision. Following O'Callahan, the
Court of Military Appeals declared that court-martial jurisdiction
existed over offenses committed by service members outside the
territorial limits of the United States51 and over petty offenses; 52 in
both cases, the right to grand jury indictment and to trial by petit
367-68.
44. Id. at 369.
45. Id. at 370.
46. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 266 n.7.
49. 401 U.S. at 357 n.3. While trial of service members for offenses committed on a mili-
tary installation may be alien to the American practice, the West German Grundgesetz
(Constitution) prohibits the peacetime creation of military courts, except in territories
outside the Federal Republic and on warships. GG art. 96a (W. Ger.). German soldiers are
therefore routinely tried in civilian courts. See generally Krueger-Sprengel, The German
Military Legal System, 57 MnL. L. Rav. 17, 19-20 (1972).
50. 401 U.S. at 365. "O'Callahan marks an area, perhaps not the limit, for the concern of
the civil courts and where the military may not enter. The case today marks an area, per-
haps not the limit, where the court-martial is appropriate and permissible. What lies be-
tween is for decision at another time." Id. at 369.
51. United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969).
52. United States v. Sharkey, 19 C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
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jury were lacking. After Relford, an on-post exception to the rule
of O'Callahan was acknowledged: If any portion of the activity sur-
rounding an offense, such as the negotiation or arrangement of a
drug transaction that would take place off-post, could be proven to
have occurred on a military installation, jurisdiction would be
found.5" Most recently, seizing upon the language of Relford that
the Court had therein marked "an area, perhaps not the limit,
where the court-martial jurisdiction is appropriate and permissi-
ble,' '54 and noting the potentially destructive impact of widespread
drug usage upon the military mission, the Court of Military Ap-
peals held in United States v. Trottier55 that "almost every in-
volvement of service personnel with the commerce in drugs is 'ser-
vice connected.'"56 The intermediate military courts of review
have taken this holding to mean that off-post drug usage,57 and
perhaps even mere possession,s are service connected. Neither the
post-O'Callahan nor post-Relford assertions of court-martial juris-
diction have reached the Supreme Court.5 9
53. See, e.g., United States v. Cornell, 9 M.J. 98 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Strang-
stalien, 7 M.J. 225 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Carr, 7 M.J. 339 (C.M.A. 1979); United
States v. Hardin, 7 M.J. 399 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Cruz, 5 M.J. 286 (C.M.A. 1978).
54. 401 U.S. at 369.
55. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
56. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Trottier and its implications, see
Schutz, Trottier and the War Against Drugs: An Update, THE ARMty LAW., Feb. 1983, at 20.
57. United States v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R.), petition denied, 12 M.J. 109
(C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884 (A.F.C.M.R.), petition denied, 12 M.J.
318 (C.M.A. 1981). The Court of Military Appeals, beyond denying review in Brace and
Lange, has recently sanctioned a prosecution for off-post drug usage, at least where metabo-
lites of the drug are discovered by urinalysis in the accused's system upon his return to
military duties. Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983).
58. On petition by the government for extraordinary relief from a military judge's dismis-
sal of a charge of off-post possession for want of subject matter jurisdiction, the Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Military Review refused relief, even though the panel "would disa-
gree" with the trial judge's decision. United States v. Labella, 14 M.J. 688, 689-90
(N.C.M.C.M.R. 1982), afl'd, 15 M.J. 228 (C.M.A. 1983). The Coast Guard Court of Military
Review has declined to find jurisdiction in such a case. United States v. Barton, 11 M.J. 621
(C.G.C.M.R.), petition denied, 11 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1981).
59. Military decisions have not reached the United States Supreme Court by either ap-
peal or writ of certiorari. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969); Ex parte Vallandingham, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). Rather, some military cases have entered the federal system by
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). See United States
v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Calley v. Callaway,
519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). Other cases have reached the
federal system by suits for backpay. See Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); Wer-
ner v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 911 (1975). See generally
Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convic-
tions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1961); Strassburg, Civilian Judicial.Review of Military Crimi-
nal Justice, 66 Mm. L. Rav. 1 (1974); Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial
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C. A Revisionist View of O'Callahan: Gosa v. Mayden (1973)
Although certiorari had been granted in Relford to answer the
question of whether O'Callahan would be retroactively applied,
the Relford Court expressly left that question for another day.60
Two years later, in Gosa v. Mayden,6' recognizing that O'Callahan
had been "a clear break with the past,"62 the Court refused to ac-
cord the decision retroactive application.
The case was a consolidation of two procedurally different ac-
tions. In Gosa v. Mayden, the accused, an airman, had been tried
and convicted by court-martial in 1966 of rape committed off-base,
while the defendant was on leave. After O'Callahan was decided,
he sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Both the dis-
trict court s and the Fifth Circuit 64 denied relief and declined to
apply O'Callahan retroactively.
In Warner v. Flemings,65 the accused, absent without authority
from his military unit in 1944, was apprehended in a stolen auto-
mobile in the civilian community. He was convicted by court-mar-
tial of both the unauthorized absence and larceny. Inter alia, a pu-
nitive discharge and confinement were given. Relying on
O'Callahan, Flemings filed suit to compel the Secretary of the
Navy to correct his military records by upgrading the punitive dis-
charge and setting aside the conviction. Unlike the Court's decision
Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54
MIL. L. REv. 1 (1971); Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YAL.E L.J. 380 (1966); Com-
ment, Civilian Court Review of Court-Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1259
(1969). Section 10 of the Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1397,
1405 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1259), altered this tortured course of review by permitting a
petition for certiorari to be filed with the Supreme Court in cases finally decided by the
Court of Military Appeals.
60. "We recognize that the retroactivity question has important dimensions, both direct
and collateral .... We have concluded, however, that the issue is better resolved in other
litigation where, perhaps, it would be solely dispositive of the case." Relford v. Comman-
dant, 401 U.S. 355, 370 (1971).
61. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
62. Id. at 672 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)).
63. 305 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 413 U.S.
665 (1973).
64. 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), afl'd, 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
65. 413 U.S. 665 (1973), rev'g United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir. 1972).
66. United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd,
458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Warner v. Flemings, 413 U.S. 665 (1973). Flem-
ings was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service, confined at hard labor
for three years, and reduced to the rank of seaman apprentice. 413 U.S. at 671.
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in Gosa, both the district court67 and the Second Circuit68 granted
the requested relief and determined that O'Callahan should be ap-
plied retroactively to expunge the conviction for the non-service-
connected offense. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both
cases to resolve the conflict among the circuits. 9
In an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Powell joined,70 Justice Blackmun, the author of Relford, be-
gan by downplaying Justice Douglas's condemnation of the mili-
tary justice system in O'Callahan:
Although the decision in O'Callahan emphasizes the difference in
procedural protections respectively afforded by the military and the
civilian tribunals, the Court certainly did not hold, or even intimate,
that the prosecution in a military court of a member of the Armed
Services for a non-service-connected crime was so unfair as to be
void ab initio.71
Despite the purportedly longstanding British and American tradi-
tion and practice recounted by Justice Douglas in his decision,
O'Callahan was deemed to have announced "a newly recognized
constitutional principle."72
After so characterizing the O'Callahan decision, the Court ap-
plied the three-part test of Stovall v. Denno7" to determine
whether O'Callahan should be given retrospective effect. The test
required judicial scrutiny of "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the adminis-
tration of justice of a retroactive application of the new stan-
67. 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
68. 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972).
69. Warner v. Flemings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972); Gosa v. Mayden, 407 U.S. 920 (1972).
70. 413 U.S. 665. Justice Rehnquist concurred. In Gosa, he would overrule O'Callahan; in
Flemings, he would find any offense committed by a service member during wartime to be
service connected. Id. at 692 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Douglas concurred for the
same reason in Flemings, but would have heard argument in Gosa concerning whether
Gosa's belated plea of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Id. at 686 (Douglas, J., concurring in part).
71. Id. at 675.
72. Id. Earlier in the opinion, Justice Blackmun recounted the very cases relied upon by
the dissent in O'Callahan. Id. at 673 (citing Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1957); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348
(1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509
(1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866)).
73. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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dards." 4 The Court concluded that all three factors favored only a
prospective application of O'Callahan.
A new constitutional rule usually will be given retroactive appli-
cation only if the old rule has "substantially impaired the truth-
finding process. . . .5 The Court found that O'Callahan's denial
of court-martial jurisdiction over non-service-connected offenses
was not due to a distrust of the "truth-finding process" of courts-
martial:
Although the opinion in O'Callahan was not uncritical of the mili-
tary system of justice, and stressed possible command influence and
the lack of procedural safeguards, . . . the decision there . . . cer-
tainly was not based on any conviction that the court-martial lacks
fundamental integrity in its truth-determining process. Indeed, our
subsequent ruling in Relford itself indicates our conclusion that mil-
itary criminal proceedings are not basically unfair, for Relford
clearly approves prosecution in a military court, of what is otherwise
a civilian crime, when factors are present that establish the offense's
"service connection. '78
Concerning the military's reliance upon the old standard of
court-martial jurisdiction, the Court acknowledged that the previ-
ous standard had been one of "the military status of the defendant
and was not dependent on the situs or nature of the offense."'7
Consequently, the "clear break with the past" of O'Callahan also
favored prospectivity.7 s
Finally, the Court determined that the orderly administration of
justice would be upset if every pre-O'Callahan prosecution were to
be called into question on the issue of service connection, particu-
larly where "there is no significant question concerning the accu-
racy of the process by which the judgment was rendered or, in
other words, when essential justice is not involved. '79 The invalida-
tion of all pre-O'Callahan convictions for non-service-connected
offenses would require either the release or retrial of the defen-
74. Gosa, 413 U.S. at 679 (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297).
75. Gosa, 413 U.S. at 680.
76. Id. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 682.
78. Indeed, "[t]he military is not to be faulted for its reliance on the law as it stood before
O'Callahan and not anticipating the 'clear break with the past' that O'Callahan entailed."
Id.
79. Id. at 685.
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dants at times when witnesses and physical evidence may have dis-
appeared or, at the very least, memories have surely dimmed. 0
Consequently, O'Callahan would be applied only prospectively.
Gosa v. Mayden was affirmed; Warner v. Flemings was reversed."1
Justice Marshall's dissent, however, highlighted the weak link in
Justice Blackmun's reasoning, his characterization of O'Callahan
as a new constitutional rule, in sharp contrast to the language of
O'Callahan itself:
I am unable to agree with the plurality's characterization of
O'Callahan. In my view, it can only be understood as a decision
dealing with the constitutional limits of the military's adjudicatory
power over offenses committed by servicemen. No decision could
more plainly involve the limits of a tribunal's power to exercise ju-
risdiction over particular offenses and thus more clearly demand ret-
roactive application.82
For the dissenters, the three-pronged Stovall test was inapplica-
ble for "O'Callahan did not mark a sharp, new departure from
prior law."8 Tracing a line of post-World War II cases in which
the military had progressively been denied court-martial jurisdic-
tion over discharged service members, 4 dependents accompanying
the military overseas,8 5 and overseas civilian employees of the
armed forces,88 Justice Marshall concluded that O'Callahan was
not the dramatic departure described by Justice Blackmun.87 In-
deed, Marshall cited a 1955 agreement between the Departments
of Justice and Defense in which the boundary of the military in-
stallation limited the investigation and prosecution of violations of
80. Id. Moreover, the records of the pre-O'Callahan courts-martial would likely be devoid
of evidence of service connection; before June 1969, service connection was not an issue
thought litigable. Finally, if non-service-connected convictions were invalidated, a vast array
of collateral matters, such as backpay, eligibility for veterans' benefits, retirement, and pen-
sion rights, would become subjects of litigation. Id. at 683.
81. Id. at 686.
82. Id. at 694. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall found implicit in the plurality's
determination to cast O'Callahan in a mold other than that of jurisdictional competency a
concession that, were O'Callahan purely jurisdictional, it would be entitled to retroactive
application. Id. at 693-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 704 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
85. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
86. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
87. Justice Marshall asserted that "these cases and O'Callahan clearly were all pieces of
the same cloth." Gosa, 413 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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federal law by service members. The Defense Department would
investigate and prosecute on-post offenses; the Justice Department
would investigate and prosecute off-post offenses.88 Thus, although
merely as a matter of accommodation and involving only violations
of federal law, a rudimentary requirement of "service connection"
had been adopted within the federal departments fourteen years
prior to O'Callahan. Consequently, Justice Marshall doubted that
"retroactive application [of O'Callahan] would do substantial vio-
lence to any legitimate, official reliance upon prior law . . .,,"
The affirmance of the conviction in Warner v. Flemings was not
unexpected; the larceny had taken place during wartime, while the
accused was absent from his unit without authority. In his concur-
rence, Justice Stewart found those facts alone to be dispositive.90
Gosa v. Mayden, however, involved an off-post off-duty sexual as-
sault virtually identical to that in O'Callahan.91 This similarity did
not go unnoticed. Justice Rehnquist would have overruled
O'Callahan;92 and Justice Stewart, although continuing to believe
that O'Callahan had been wrongly decided, would have reversed
Gosa v. Mayden unless O'Callahan were overruled. 93 At a mini-
mum, Gosa v. Mayden presented the Court with an opportunity to
recharacterize O'Callahan as a new and unexpected development
in the law, rather than as evolutionary and inevitable. Declining to
reverse itself within only four years, the Court instead noted the
harsh language of Justice Douglas and exempted decades of non-
service-connected prosecutions from the rule of O'Callahan.
D. The Abstention Doctrine in Courts-Martial: Schlesinger v.
Councilman (1975)
After Relford had determined that O'Callahan would not be ap-
plied to on-post offenses and after Gosa v. Mayden had declined to
render O'Callahan retrospective, the Court in Schlesinger v. Coun-
88. Id. (citing Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dep'ts of Justice and Defense
Relating to Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two Dep'ts have Concurrent Jurisdiction
(July 19, 1955)). This memorandum still provides the foundation for interdepartmental allo-
cation of authority. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, app. 3.
89. 413 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 693 (Stewart, J., concurring in Flemings).
91. In O'Callahan, the offense was attempted rape, 395 U.S. 258, 260 (1969); in Gosa, it
was rape, 413 U.S. at 669.
92. 413 U.S. at 692 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 693 (Stewart, J., dissenting in Gosa).
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cilman 4 determined that the integrity of the court-martial and
military appellate processes ought to be respected and that the
federal courts should not prematurely intrude in order to impose
their particular notions of "service connection" under O'Callahan.
Captain Bruce R. Councilman had been apprehended for the off-
post sale and transfer of marijuana to an undercover military in-
vestigator. When the case proceeded to trial, Councilman moved to
dismiss the charges against him for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under O'Callahan.95 After an evidentiary hearing, the military
judge denied the motion. Prior to the scheduled trial date, Coun-
cilman sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary in-
junction to prevent his court-martial, alleging that he would suffer
"great and irreparable damage" were his military trial for a non-
service-connected offense to go forward. Both the district court
and the Tenth Circuit agreed, and the court-martial was
enjoined.9"
The Supreme Court reversed. Citing Younger v. Harris,97 a case
mandating federal abstention from ongoing state criminal proceed-
ings, Justice Powell analogized a military court-martial to both
state prosecutions and federal administrative proceedings. In the
former situation, under notions of federalism, the federal courts
will stay their equitable powers until the case has run its course in
the state system. Despite allegations of "great and irreparable
damage," such cases actually threaten the accused with no "injury
other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought
lawfully and in good faith.""8 Similarly, in the case of federal ad-
ministrative proceedings, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine re-
quires the applicant to pursue all administrative avenues prior to
bringing suit in federal court. This doctrine permits administrative
bodies "to develop the facts, to apply the law in which they are
peculiarly expert, and to correct their own errors. . . . [W]hatever
judicial review is available will be informed and narrowed by the
agencies' own decisions." 99
94. 420 U.S. 738 (1975), rev'g Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973).
95. Motions in bar of trial are made to the military judge in the absence of the court-
members. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 39(a), 10 U.S.C. § 839(A) (1982).
96. Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
97. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes 310-15.
98. 420 U.S. at 754 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).
99. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756. One commentator has suggested that an
additional consideration was the Court's desire to alleviate the caseload of federal district
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Abstention by federal courts from a pending court-martial pro-
ceeding recognizes the specialized nature of military society which
requires "respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in
civilian life." 100 Justice Powell left untouched the congressional
scheme whereby members of the military are tried by "an inte-
grated system of military courts and review procedures, a critical
element of which is the Court of Military Appeals consisting of ci-
vilian judges. . . who. . . gain over time thorough familiarity with
military problems."101 Review in the federal courts, whether by pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus 0 2 or suit for backpay,'0 3 is ulti-
mately available. Justice Powell distinguished earlier cases in
which federal intervention into court-martial proceedings had been
permitted because each of these cases had involved civilians, over
whom military jurisdiction was clearly lacking. 04 As a captain on
active duty in the armed forces, Councilman could not lay claim to
those precedents. Accordingly, the military process ought not to
have been interrupted by the federal courts in this case.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall would have granted the
relief sought. In rejecting the applicability of the abstention doc-
trine, the dissent failed to discern "any special 'expertise of the
military courts,' including the Court of Military Appeals, that even
approximates the far greater expertise of civilian courts in the de-
termination of constitutional questions of jurisdiction."'1 5 Justice
Brennan observed that the offense was not uniquely military, but
"a common everyday type of drug offense that federal courts en-
counter all over the country every day."'1 6 After citing a series of
decisions in which the Court of Military Appeals uniformly found
jurisdiction over off-post drug offenses,0 7 the dissent viewed the
courts. Everett, Military Justice in the Wake of Parker v. Levy, 67 MIu. L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).
100. 420 U.S. at 757.
101. Id. at 758 (citations omitted).
102. See, e.g., Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
104. 420 U.S. at 759 (citing McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (civilian employee); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (dependent); United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (discharged serviceman)).
105. 420 U.S. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A few sentences later, the dissent echoed
O'Caitahan: "It is virtually hornbook law that 'courts-martial as an institution are singularly
inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law.'" Id. at 765 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)).
107. 420 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this view, the dissent was, at the time,
correct. In United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969), the Court of
Military Appeals adopted a per se rule of service connection for offenses by service members
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1984] THE BURGER COURT AND THE MILITARY
requirement of exhaustion as a futile exercise.10 8
Examining the jurisdictional issue, Justice Brennan applied the
twelve Relford factors 0 9 and failed to perceive any evidence of spe-
cial military interest in the case.110
The significance of Schlesinger v. Councilman lies in both the
tone and the import of the decision. In terms far from the deroga-
tory language of O'Callahan, the majority accorded the military
justice system in general, and the Court of Military Appeals in par-
ticular, a specialized role akin to that of both state court systems
and federal administrative agencies. Additionally, the Court moved
to protect the integrity of this system. Absent a gross abuse of the
court-martial process, such as the trial of a civilian, the federal
courts were forbidden from intruding upon the military justice sys-
tem. Whatever "travesties" might occur within the system would
be reviewable only by collateral attack after an exhaustion of mili-
tary appeals.
E. Validating the Summary Court-Martial: Middendorf v.
Henry (1976)
In O'Callahan, the Warren Court had dwelt upon the differences
between a military court-martial and a civilian trial to the detri-
involving drugs. In 1976, however, the court abrogated this rule and opted instead to study
each case individually for a service connection with the post. United States v. McCarthy, 2
M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976). See supra note 53 and accompanying text. This ad hoc approach has
produced some absurd results. Jurisdiction has been sustained, for example, over a drug sale
which occurred miles from the post, because some discussion of the offense had taken place
on the post. See United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225 (C.M.A. 1979). On the other
hand, court-martial jurisdiction has been denied for a drug sale which took place on an
"isle" of civilian property completely surrounded by Fort Belvoir, Virginia, only yards from
the installation. (Whether by land or air, the drugs inevitably would have been transported
onto Fort Belvoir.) United States v. Klink, 5 M.J. 404 (C.M.A. 1978) (per curiam). More
recently, however, in recognition of the gravity of the drug problem in the armed forces, the
Court of Military Appeals has virtually, if not admittedly, returned to a per se rule of juris-
diction. See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Trottier, 9
M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
108. 420 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex rel. Guagliardo v.
McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 929 n.4. (D.C. Cir. 1958), afl'd, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)).
109. 401 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 41.
110. Perhaps this conclusion could have been avoided by a better development of the
record at the Article 39(a) session at the accused's court-martial, for Justice Brennan wrote:
"[T]he record is devoid of any evidence whatever that use of marijuana in any amounts
under any circumstances adversely affects a serviceman's performance of his duties.
Whatever might be the judgment of medical, psychological, and sociological research in
these particulars, none was introduced in this record." 420 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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ment of the military justice system. In Middendorf v. Henry,11 the
Burger Court used the same distinction to permit the denial of
counsel to an accused tried before the most unique of military
tribunals, the summary court-martial.
A summary court-martial is a trial of enlisted personnel before a
court consisting of a single officer who essentially serves as prose-
cutor, defense counsel, judge, and jury." 2 The summary court of-
ficer is obligated to advise the accused of his rights in the proceed-
ing, including the right to remain silent, the right to have witnesses
summoned on his behalf, the right to cross-examine witnesses who
testify against him, and, most significantly, the right to decline
trial by summary court-martial." 3 Upon a refusal of consent by the
accused to trial by summary court-martial, the case is returned to
the convening authority,"4 who determines whether the case
should be pursued to a higher level of court-martial." 5
If a summary court-martial proceeds to trial, the summary court
officer must call all witnesses listed by the government" 6 or re-
111. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
112. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816(3) (1982).
113. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982). This last provision
was added by the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1334 (1968)
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.), which became effective after the O'Callahan
decision. See infra text accompanying note 285. For a "script" for procedures at a summary
court-martial, see U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAmPHLrr No. 27-7, MITrrARY JUSTICE HANDBOOC
GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL TRIAL PROCEDURE (1982).
114. The "convening authority" is the person who initially directed that the charges pro-
ceed to trial. Designation of the individual who may convene a summary court-martial is
found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 24, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (1982).
115. At a special or general court-martial, the potential penalties may be more severe, but
the accused is afforded more rights. For example, the accused has a choice of counsel, who
may be appointed or requested, military or civilian. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art.
38, 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1982). The accused also has a choice of trial before a court consisting
entirely of officers or, if the accused is an enlisted member, of at least one-third enlisted
membership. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1982). The trial
also may be before a military judge alone. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 16, 10
U.S.C. § 816 (1982). Additionally, as in civilian courts, the accused has a right of compulsory
process and confrontation, Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1982),
and to remain silent at trial, Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831
(1982).
The case may be disposed of in other ways. For example, the accused may be made sub-
ject to administrative discharge proceedings. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 635-200,
Personnel Separations-Enlisted Personnel, chs. 13, 14 (Oct. 1, 1982). Or the accused may
be reprimanded or admonished, either orally or in writing. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army
Reg. No. 600-37, Personnel-General-Unfavorable Information, ch. 2 (Nov. 15, 1980). Re-
medial training is also a command option. See Kaczynski, The School of the Soldier: Reme-
dial Training or Prohibited Punishment, THE ARMY LAW., June 1981, at 17.
116. The government's witnesses are typically listed by name and unit of assignment on
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quested by the accused. The summary court officer alone deter-
mines the issue of guilt or innocence. If acquitted, the accused may
not later be retried for the offense 17 If he is convicted, the poten-
tial penalties are relatively minor. 1"8 Any conviction or sentence is
subject to the clemency powers of the convening authority.119
In Middendorf v. Henry,12" certain enlisted members of the
Marine Corps had been convicted by summary courts-martial and
sentenced to confinement. None had been afforded counsel at their
trials. Before the Supreme Court, they asserted that Argersinger v.
Hamlin 2' required defense counsel to be provided in every crimi-
nal proceeding which could result in imprisonment. Therefore, the
military lacked authority to try the defendants by summary court-
martial without affording them counsel.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist rejected the claim. Cru-
cial to the attachment of the right to counsel in Argersinger was
the existence of a criminal prosecution. The mere fact that a pro-
ceeding might result in a loss of liberty was not dispositive; neither
juvenile hearings nor probation revocation hearings, both of which
could result in loss of liberty, invoked the protections of
Argersinger.22 Noting that a summary court tries minor offenses,
metes out minor punishments, and has procedures different from a
criminal trial, the Court concluded that a summary court-martial
is not an adversary proceeding which invokes the right to coun-
sel. 1 23 Finally, the insertion of counsel into a summary court-mar-
tial might prove a burden to the military:
the front page of the "Charge Sheet," Dep't of Defense Form 458. See U.S. Dep't of Army
Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services-Military Justice, para. 5-143 (Sept. 1, 1982).
117. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 44, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1982).
118. In cases involving junior enlisted personnel, the maximum permissible punishments
include confinement for as long as 30 days or hard labor without confinement for as long as
45 days, forfeiture of as much as two-thirds of a month's pay, and reduction to the lowest
grade. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982). Junior enlisted
personnel include service members in the first four enlisted-pay grades: Private (E-1), Pri-
vate (E-2), Private First Class (E-3), and Corporal/Specialist Four (E-4). For enlisted per-
sonnel above the fourth pay grade, the maximum punishments include a single-grade reduc-
tion, forfeiture of two-thirds of a month's pay, and extra duty for as long as 60 days. Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1302(a)(d)(2) (1984).
119. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1108-09 (1984); see also Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, art. 64, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1982).
120. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
121. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
122. 425 U.S. at 35-37.
123. Id. at 39-41.
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[P]resence of counsel will turn a brief, informal hearing which may
be quickly convened and rapidly concluded into an attenuated pro-
ceeding which consumes the resources of the military to a degree
which Congress could have properly felt to be beyond what is war-
ranted by the relative insignificance of the offenses being tried. 2 '
If the accused desires counsel, he may decline trial by summary
court-martial and, should the case proceed to a higher level of
court-martial, be assigned counsel then. 12 5 Justices Powell and
Blackmun concurred, finding that the "unique military exigencies"
themselves could distinguish Argersinger.126
In dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that Argersinger held
that the relatively minor period of confinement is irrelevant when
considering the- issue of whether counsel should be provided. 12
Moreover, the Court of Military Appeals, "a body with recognized
expertise in dealing with military problems,"' 28 had determined
that Argersinger applied to summary courts-martial. 29 Whether a
summary court should try only military offenses ignores the fact
that "a substantial portion of the offenses actually tried by sum-
mary courts-martial are offenses, such as larceny and assault, that
would also constitute offenses if committed by a civilian.' 30 Addi-
tionally, the summary court-martial process possesses authority to
try any noncapital offense cognizable under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and includes nonmilitary offenses. 131 The choice of
proceeding without counsel at a summary court or refusing the
summary court in order to secure the assistance of counsel
124. Id. at 45.
125. Id. at 46-47. The Court analogized this choice, of accepting a counsel-less trial by
summary court-martial or exposing oneself to potentially more severe penalties in order to
obtain counsel, to that of either pleading guilty to a lesser offense, thus waiving a trial alto-
gether, or contesting the greater charge and thus taking the risk of the attendant greater
penalties. Id. at 47-48.
126. Id. at 49 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
127. 425 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in the dissent.
128. Id. at 66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 101.
129. United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
130. 425 U.S. at 57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The author's experience as a summary
court-martial officer in 57 cases in the 25th Infantry Division supports this observation. In
27 of the cases, the most serious charge was a nonmilitary offense. Included were prosecu-
tions for larceny, possession and use of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, assault,
destruction of private property, and receiving stolen property. In 20 of the cases, the ac-
cused was represented by counsel.
131. 425 U.S. at 57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Regardless of the identity of the offense,
however, the maximum punishments prescribed in Uniform Code of Military Justice, art.
20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982), still apply.
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presents the constitutionally questionable scheme of "two levels of
imprisonment for the same offense-a lower tier for defendants
who are willing to proceed to trial without counsel, and a higher
one for those who insist on having the assistance of counsel.
132
The Supreme Court's ruling that Argersinger is inapplicable to
summary courts-martial, in the face of a Court of Military Appeals
decision that the right to counsel attached, is truly remarkable.
1 33
Perhaps reading reluctance in Argersinger's split decision, the Su-
preme Court may have felt free to rule otherwise. In so doing, it
validated a procedure which might well have been one of the
"travesties" under the Uniform Code of Military Justice that Jus-
tice Douglas had had in mind in O'Callahan.
III. THE BURGER COURT AND PERSONAL LIBERTIES IN THE
MILITARY
A. An Admonition: Parisi v. Davidson (1972)
That the strengthening of military authority evident in the deci-
sions from Relford through Middendorf was not without limits was
demonstrated a year after Relford in Parisi v. Davidson.1 34 Parisi,
a service member, was inducted into the armed forces, but later
applied for discharge as a conscientious objector. He was denied
the status by the Department of the Army. Subsequently, he
sought relief from the Army Board for the Correction of Military
Records (ABCMR) and, a few days later, commenced a habeas
corpus proceeding in federal court. The court deferred a hearing on
the merits of the petition until the ABCMR had rendered its
decision.135
While both actions were pending, Parisi was ordered to board an
aircraft for deployment to Vietnam, where he was to perform
noncombat duties. He refused to obey the order and was court-
martialed and convicted. While the charges were pending, the
ABCMR rejected Parisi's application for relief. The federal court
with jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition announced that it
would defer ruling upon the petition until the military criminal ap-
peals process had been exhausted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
132. 425 U.S. at 71 (Marshall J., dissenting).
133. "Dealing with areas of the law peculiar to the military branches, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals' judgments are normally entitled to great deference." Id. at 43.
134. 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
135. Id. at 36.
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stay.138
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Historically,
the writ of habeas corpus had been a remedy for service members
alleging improper retention in the armed forces. 3 7 But, prior to
being afforded relief in federal court, the petitioner must have
availed himself of the administrative avenues of appeal provided
by law.' Under this exhaustion of remedies doctrine, but for the
court-martial conviction, the district court undoubtedly would
have entertained Parisi's petition since his appeal to the ABCMR
had been unsuccessful.139
The Supreme Court found, however, that the existence of a
criminal proceeding was legally irrelevant to the adjudication of
the administrative habeas claim:
Under accepted principles of comity, the court should stay its hand
only if the relief that the petitioner seeks-discharge as a conscien-
tious objector-would also be available to him with reasonable
promptness and certainty through the machinery of the military ju-
dicial system in its processing of the court-martial charge. "4
The issue of the improper denial of conscientious-objector status,
however, would constitute only a defense to Parisi's criminal
charge, i.e. that the order to proceed to Vietnam was unlawful.''
Even if acquitted, Parisi would remain on active duty in the armed
forces because the relief sought by his habeas corpus petition could
not be granted through the military judicial system. 42 Conse-
136. 435 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1970).
137. 405 U.S. at 39 (citing Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 990
(1971); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S.
304 (1946)).
138. 405 U.S. at 37.
139. Id. at 39.
140. Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted).
141. The Court noted that existing Army regulations directed that, as far as it was practi-
cal, conscientious-objector applicants be retained in their units pending final decisions on
their applications. Id. at 42 n.9 (citing U.S. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 635-20). The Court of
Military Appeals had recognized that the erroneous rejection of conscientious-objector sta-
tus by the Secretary of the Army would constitute a defense to a charge of disobedience of
an order to perform duties inconsistent with that status. United States v. Noyd, 18 C.M.A.
483, 492, 40 C.M.R. 195, 204 (1969). In general, however, an order relating to military duty
is presumptively valid, and the burden rests heavily upon one who has disobeyed it to
demonstrate its illegality. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, para. 14c(2)(a)(i)
(1984).
142. Parisi, 405 U.S. at 43 n.12.
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quently, "the pendency of court-martial proceedings. . . [should]
not delay a federal district court's prompt determination of the
conscientious objector claim of a serviceman who has exhausted all
administrative remedies ....
Although logically reasoned and precedentially secure, the
Court's decision may also have been influenced by the apparent
arrogance of the military in ordering an avowed conscientious ob-
jector, whose claim had not been finally adjudicated, to a war zone,
albeit in a noncombat status. Indeed, the Court noted the "historic
respect in this Nation for valid conscientious objection to military
service."14 Parisi recognizes limitations on the deference of the
Burger Court to internal military authority. Callousness or disdain
for historically protected rights will be promptly and surely
remedied.
B. Free Speech and the Military Mission
1. In General
Although "members of the military are not excluded from the
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different charac-
ter of the military community and of the military mission requires
a different application of those protections."4 5 Some examples of
the differing protections given speech in the civilian and military
communities are obvious. To insult one's superior in the civilian
community may be rude and may lead to unemployment; in the
military, it is a crime.146 To speak contemptuously of the President
or a Governor indicates only that the civilian may vote for the op-
ponent in the next election; in the military, it is a crime.
147
A military commander has the inherent authority to maintain
security and discipline on the installation. The extent to which a
commander may limit free speech on the installation pursuant to
those ends has concerned the Burger Court. After some early hesi-
143. Id. at 45.
144. Id. The Court observed that, where the court-martial charge is wholly unrelated to
the claim of conscientious objection, such as a charge of larceny, a district court might grant
habeas relief, but stay its order of discharge from the service pending the petitioner's trial
and sentence (if applicable). Id. at 46 n.15.
145. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
146. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1982) (proscribing disre-
spect toward a commissioned officer); id., art. 91, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1982) (forbidding in-
surbordinate conduct toward a warrant or petty officer or a noncommissioned officer).
147. Id., art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1982).
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tation, the Court has afforded the commander great control over
forms of speech and assembly occurring on the installation,
whether involving civilians or military personnel.
2. The Civilian and the Military Installation: Flower v. United
States (1972) and Greer v. Spock (1976)
Section 1382 of Title 18 of the United States Code, provides
that, "[Wihoever reenters or is found within [a military] ...in-
stallation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to
reenter by any officer or person in command or charge
thereof-Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not
more than six months, or both.
1 48
John Thomas Flower had been barred by the military com-
mander from Fort Sam Houston, Texas because of "alleged partici-
pation in an attempt to distribute 'unauthorized' leaflets" on the
post.149 Flower subsequently returned to Fort Sam Houston and
again distributed leaflets. He was arrested by military authorities
and convicted in federal district court of violating section 1382.
This conviction was later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.150
In an unusual procedure, the Supreme Court immediately
granted certiorari and then reversed and remanded the conviction,
per curiam. 151 Relying on the dissent to the Fifth Circuit opinion,
the Court cited evidence that the avenue where Flower was distrib-
uting leaflets was generally open to the public, traffic traversed the
street constantly, civilian public and private transportation regu-
larly used it as a route, and the sidewalks were open to military
and civilian alike. Accordingly, "Fort Sam Houston was an open
post [and] ... the street . . .was a completely open street."152
This circumstance indicated to the Supreme Court that "the mili-
tary has abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who
walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue. The base com-
mandant can no more order .. . [Flower] off this public street
than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982).
149. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam).
150. 425 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1972).
151. 407 U.S. 197 (1972) ("Accordingly, without need to set the matter for further argu-
ment, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the conviction." Id. at 199).
152. Id. at 198 (quoting United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 90 (5th Cir. 1972) (Simpson,
J., dissenting)).
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street.'1 53 Since first -amendment rights, such as handing out leaf-
lets may properly be exercised on streets, Flower's activity was
constitutionally protected from interference by the military au-
thorities as long as the activity was conducted in an orderly
fashion.15 4
Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by the Chief Justice, high-
lighted the conundrum which the majority had presented to the
post commander:
He may close access to civilian traffic on New Braunfels Avenue and
other traffic arteries traversing the post, thereby rendering the post
once more subject to the authority that Congress intended him to
have, but also causing substantial inconvenience to civilian residents
of ... [the surrounding county] who presently use these arteries.
Or, he may continue to accommodate the convenience of the resi-
dents, but only at the cost of surrendering the authority Congress
conferred upon him under 18 U.S.C. 1382 to control access to the
post he commands. 155
In the year following Flower, the open post rationale was often
argued as a basis for access to military property. 156
In 1972, Benjamin Spock and Julius Hobson, then the People's
Party candidates for President and Vice-President respectively,
and Linda Jenress and Andrew Pulley, Socialist Workers Party
candidates for the same offices, requested permission of the com-
manding general of Fort Dix, New Jersey to enter Fort Dix to dis-
tribute campaign literature and discuss the upcoming election is-
sues with those on the installation. Pursuant to two Fort Dix
regulations which prohibited political activity' 57 and the distribu-
153. 407 U.S. at 198.
154. Id. at 198-99.
155. Id. at 201 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1973) (arguing the
open-post doctrine to prohibit issuance of a bar letter (i.e., an order issued by an installation
commander forbidding an individual to reenter that installation under 18 U.S.C. § 1382
(1982)), following an antiwar protest outside the Air Force Academy's football stadium);
Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880-82 (4th Cir. 1973) (arguing the doctrine to permit
leafletting in areas open to the civilian public); McGaw v. Farrow, 472 F.2d 952, 957 (4th
Cir. 1973) (asserting the open-post rationale to permit access to the post's chapel for an
antiwar memorial service); CCCO Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644, 649-50
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (arguing the doctrine to allow leafleteers access to military installation).
See generally Rosenow, Open House or Open Forum: When Commanders Invite the Public
on Base, 24 A.F.L. REv. 260 (1984).
157. "Demonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar
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tion of printed material without prior command approval,158 the
commander denied the request and indicated that the proposed ac-
tivity would interfere with the basic training mission on the
post.159 The candidates filed suit in federal district court to enjoin
enforcement of those regulations. Although the district court de-
nied relief, the Third Circuit granted preliminary' 0 and perma-
nent 61 injunctions. Spock eventually campaigned at Fort Dix.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the part of
the permanent injunction that prohibited the military authorities
from prospective enforcement of the regulatory ban on political
speeches and distributions of political literature.1 62 Distinguishing
Flower, the Court found that the military had not abandoned con-
trol over the base so as to create a public forum.16 To the con-
trary, "[t]he guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant
'that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a
constitutional right to do so however and whenever they
please.' ",164 Since the primary business of Fort Dix is "to train
soldiers, not to provide a public forum,"'1 5 the Fort Dix com-
mander retained the authority to exclude from the confines of the
post any activity which would be detrimental to the military mis-
sion.' The regulations were neutrally applied and served the
traditional goal of "keeping official military activities there wholly
free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any
kind.' 6 7 Consequently, the regulations were a legitimate exercise
activities are prohibited and will not be conducted on the Fort Dix Military Reservation."
Fort Dix Reg. No. 210-26 (1968).
158. "The distribution or posting of any publication . . . issued, published or otherwise
prepared by any person, persons, agency or agencies . . . is prohibited . . . without prior
written approval of the Adjutant General, this headquarters." Fort Dix Reg. No. 210-27
(1970).
159. The letter from the commanding general cited the two post regulations and training
needs as bases for denial of the requested appearances. Additionally, the general expressed
the opinion that granting this request, where all others had been denied, might appear as an
endorsement of the speakers' candidacies by the command. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
833 n.3 (1976).
160. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972).
161. Spock v. David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974).
162. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). As to the 1972 ruling concerning Spock, the issue was moot;
Spock had later campaigned at Fort Dix pursuant to the court order. Id. at 834.
163. Abandonment of control was never an issue before the Court of Appeals. Id. at 837.
164. Id. at 836 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)).
165. 424 U.S. at 838.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 839.
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of command authority.16 8
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. At the outset, they
found nothing in the record to differentiate Flower factually from
the present case. Civilian automobile and pedestrian traffic regu-
larly passed through Fort Dix, and visitors from the general public
frequented nonrestricted areas. Public transportation served the
post, and the base entrance was neither guarded by a sentry nor
blocked by a barrier. The dissent found the majority's claim that
Fort Sam Houston was "open," yet Fort Dix was "closed" to be an
insufficient basis for their decision." 9
The areas proposed for the distribution of literature and for po-
litical campaigning were nonrestricted portions of the post which
were frequented by civilian traffic.
Those areas do not differ in their nature and use from city streets
and lots where open speech long has been protected .... There is
no credible claim here that distributing leaflets in those areas would
impair to any significant degree the Government's interests in train-
ing recruits or, broadly, national defense. °
The decision in Greer v. Spock, however, did not end litigation
over whether a "public forum" could be created on a military in-
stallation. In Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air
Force,' the military invited the public onto an air force base for
an "open house," which included demonstrations of military equip-
ment and aerial displays. Certain defense contractors were invited
to attend, but a group opposing the arms race requested and was
denied permission to attend -because their proposed activities
168. The Court stressed that the record indicated an evenhanded application of this pol-
icy. Id. at 838-39. A different case might be presented if the regulations were applied "irra-
tionally, invidiously, or arbitrarily." Id. at 840. Both Chief Justice Burger, id. (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), and Justice Powell, id. at 842 (Powell, J., concurring), concurred separately and
stressed the need for an apparent and actual separation of the military from partisan
politics.
169. Id. at 849-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan appended to his opinion
photographs of New Braunfels Avenue, found to be "open" in Flower, and the front gate to
Fort Dix, found to be "closed" in Greer v. Spock. Any differences were not discernible to the
observer. Id. at 871.
170. Id. at 861 (footnote and citation omitted). Justice Marshall, in his dissent, alleged
that this case, and that of Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (see supra notes 111-33
and accompanying text), "go distressingly far toward deciding that fundamental constitu-
tional rights can be denied to both civilians and servicemen whenever the military thinks its
functioning would be enhanced by so doing." 424 U.S. at 873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982).
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(which included songs and distributions of peace literature) "would
not be in keeping with the purpose of the Open House pro-
gram.' 17 2 A federal district court denied a request for a prelimi-
nary injunction which would have permitted the group to partici-
pate in the open house, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The circuit court rejected the argument that the open house cre-
ated a public forum and that the Air Force abandoned control over
the base for a one-day period, stating, "the detailed operations
plan for the event and the concerns it reflects for security, traffic
flow and personnel are inconsistent with a one-day abandon-
ment. '173 Moreover, the fact that the open house was a community
relations project did not turn the Air Force into an advocate of any
particular nuclear policy so as to open the forum to differing view-
points. The military's display of equipment and capabilities was
merely a demonstration of how the Air Force would fulfill its mili-
tary mission. 17 4 Furthermore, the defense contractors' participation
in the forum did not deny the peace group equal protection since
the contractors' weaponry displays were supportive of the purpose
of the open house.175 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.17
A different result however, was reached by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Albertini.177 There, the court reversed a convic-
tion for violation of section 1382 by an antinuclear protester who
had returned to Hickam Air Force Base during an open house, af-
ter having been issued a bar letter by the base commander. 78 The
court found that the character of the open house was akin to that
of a state fairgrounds and was similar to the situation in
Flower-the military had essentially abandoned control over the
base "for the duration of the day's festivities. 1 79 As a result, the
base constituted a public forum, and the military commander
could not restrict the orderly activity of Albertini in the
nonrestricted areas.
Thus, military control over civilian activities on military installa-
172. 675 F.2d at 1012.
173. Id. at 1015-16.
174. Id. at 1022.
175. The contractors' displays did no more than explain the current state of Air Force
weaponry. Id.
176. 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982).
177. 710 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. Apr. 3,
1984) (No. 83-1624).
178. Id. at 1412, 1413 n.1. See supra note 156 for a definition of a "bar letter."
179. 710 F.2d at 1415.
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tions, at least in the first amendment realm, remains a source of
litigation. The ruling in Greer v. Spock and the subsequent denial
of review in Persons for Free Speech at SAC, suggest that, if cer-
tiorari is granted in Albertini, the Court will reverse the Ninth
Circuit.
3. Activities of a Service Member: Parker v. Levy (1974), Brown
v. Glines (1980), and Secretary of the Navy v. Huff (1980)
Although the permissible limitations on civilian free speech on
military installations are still unclear, the Burger Court has spoken
more definitely with regard to the restrictions applicable to service
members.
In Parker v. Levy,18 0 an Army dermatologist stationed at the
Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina had made
various statements to subordinates which were highly critical of
the government, the Army, and the Vietnam War.181 Levy was
tried and convicted by court-martial for conduct unbecoming an
officer and for having caused a disruption to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces,""2 in violation of Articles
133183 and 13484 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
After exhausting his military appeals,185 Captain Levy was also
denied a writ of habeas corpus by a federal district court; never-
theless, the Third Circuit reversed and found both Articles 133 and
180. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
181. Levy asserted that he would refuse an order to go to Vietnam, that blacks should
refuse to fight in Vietnam because they suffer from discrimination in the United States and
are given the most hazardous duty, and that "Special Forces personnel are liars and thieves
and killers of peasants and murderers of women and children." Id. at 737.
182. Levy had also disobeyed an order from the hospital commandant to conduct certain
training for Special Forces personnel, for which he was convicted under Uniform Code of
Military Justice, art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1982). 417 U.S. at 739-40 & n.6.
183. "Any commissioned officer ... who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." Uniform Code of Military
Justice, art. 133, U.S.C. § 933 (1982).
184. Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a gen-
eral, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the
offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 134, U.S.C. § 934 (1982).
185. The conviction was affirmed by an Army Board of Review, United States v. Levy, 39
C.M.R. 672 (A.B.R. 1968), and the Court of Military Appeals denied review. 18 C.M.A. 627
(1969).
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134 to be void for vagueness.""
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir-
cuit.187 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted:
This court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also rec-
ognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and
traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between
the military and civilian communities result from the fact that "it is
the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise."'' 8
The historical development in British and American military law
of punishment for conduct unbecoming an officer and disorders in-
uring to the prejudice of the good order and discipline of the
armed forces were just such "laws and traditions."' 89
In light of the unique mission of the military and this tradition,
the Court declined to equate the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) to a civilian criminal code:
[The UCMJ] and the various versions of the Articles of War which
have preceded it, regulate aspects of the conduct of members of the
military which in the civilian sphere are left unregulated. While a
civilian criminal code carves out a relatively small segment of poten-
tial conduct and declares its criminal, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice essays more varied regulation of a much larger segment of
the activities of the more tightly knit military community. 90
Although there is no civilian counterpart to the challenged Arti-
cles of the UCMJ, the service member is not left uneducated with
regard to proscribed conduct. The Manual for Courts-Martial of
186. 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
187. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
188. 417 U.S. at 743 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17
(1955)).
189. The Court found counterparts to Articles 133 and 134 in the Articles of the Earl of
Essex (1642), the British Articles of War of 1765, and the American Articles of War from
1776 to the present Code. 417 U.S. at 745-49.
190. 417 U.S. at 749. On the other hand, the military justice system may dispense fairly
minor punishments, some of which, such as reduction in rank or dismissal from the service,
reminded the Court of the civilian "law of labor-management relations as much as the civil-
ian criminal law." Id. at 750.
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1969 provided over sixty examples of Article 134 violations.191
Likewise, conduct unbecoming an officer, in violation of Article
133, was well-defined by the decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals.
192
The Court concluded that Levy
could have had no reasonable doubt that his public statements urg-
ing Negro enlisted men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to do so
were both "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and "to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces," in viola-
tion of the provisions of Arts. 133 and 134, respectively .... [H]is
challenge to them as unconstitutionally vague under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment must fail.193
Answering the assertion that the statutes were overbroad, the
Court found that "[t]he fundamental necessity for. . . imposition
of discipline, may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."'94 Con-
sequently, whatever Captain Levy's conception of the standards of
an Army officer might have been, "[h]is conduct, that of a commis-
sioned officer publicly urging enlisted personnel to refuse to obey
orders which might send them into combat, was unprotected under
the most expansive notions of the First Amendment."1 5
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, could not find an exception in the
Bill of Rights for speech in the military. "In our society where di-
191. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, para. 213 (rev. ed. 1969). The Manual for
Courts-Martial is an executive order issued by the President pursuant to his constitutional
authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, and his statu-
tory authority to prescribe the procedure for trials of courts-martial, Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982). A major revision of the Manual took place in
1969; the next was completed in 1984.
192. 417 U.S. at 752-53 (citing United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338
(1972); United States v. Harvey, 19 C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 14 (1972); United States v.
Sadinsky, 14 C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964); United States v. Holiday, 4 C.M.A. 454, 16
C.M.R. 28 (1954); United States v. Frantz, 2 C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953)).
193. 417 U.S. at 757.
194. Id. at 758.
195. Id. at 761. Although not extensively discussed by the Court, a factor in the decision
may have been the fact that the forum chosen by Captain Levy for his tirades, Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, was a basic training post. Thus, the most easily influenced recipients of
Captain Levy's message, that is, the youngest, least educated, and perhaps involuntarily
conscripted service members, would have been based there. Three weeks after the Levy de-
cision, on the authority of Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court upheld a Marine enlisted
man's court-martial conviction under Article 134 for attempting to distribute antiwar litera-
ture in Vietnam. Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (per curiam).
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versities are supposed to flourish it never could be 'unbecoming' to
express one's views, even on the most controversial public issue.' 196
While the views of Captain Levy might have "affronted some of his
superiors, [who had expected] homogenized individuals who
think-as well as march-in unison,' 1 97 the criminality of this ac-
tivity is constitutionally doubtful. Whatever Captain Levy said, it
was "his own belief-an article of faith that he sincerely held." '
In Justice Douglas' view, regardless of the forum of enlisted train-
ees, "[u]ttering one's beliefs is sacrosanct under the First Amend-
ment. Punishing the utterances is an 'abridgement' of speech in
the constitutional sense.' 199
Justice Stewart, also dissenting,200 found it "hard to imagine
criminal statutes more patently unconstitutional than these vague
and uncertain general articles ... ."201 Regardless of the interpre-
tation given to specific instances of activity prohibited under the
UCMJ, Articles 133 and 134 were themselves designed to defy lim-
itation: "In short, the general articles are in practice as well as the-
ory 'catch-als,' designed to allow prosecutions for practically any
conduct that may offend the sensibilities of a military com-
mander. 20 2 An assertion that the general articles were narrowed
by a "combination of military custom and instinct" is inapplicable
to an army of millions, many of whom at the time of Levy's con-
duct were conscripts. 20 3 To expect those service members to be im-
bued with the same notions of tradition that may have existed in
times of a small standing Army was "an act of judicial fantasy."2 °4
196. 417 U.S. at 769 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 770 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas saw no distinction between announcing those
beliefs to impressionable subordinates in public while on duty and reading newspapers,
books, plays, poems, or periodicals or holding conversations in bars or at meetings while off-
duty. Id. at 769.
200. Justices Douglas and Brennan joined Justice Stewart's dissent. Id. at 773 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 774 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart referred to the Supreme Court
decisions which had invalidated laws prohibiting behavior labelled "misconduct" or "repre-
hensible," Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); "annoying," Coates v. City of Cin-
cinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); or "prejudicial to the best interests" of a city, Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam).
202. 417 U.S. at 779 (footnote omitted) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 781-82 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 782 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart discounted the mandatory train-
ing in military justice which is given to all newly arrived inductees because only a small
amount of time is devoted to exploring the nuances of the general articles. Id. at 782-83 n.27
(citing U.S. Dep't of Army Subject Schedule 21-10, Military Justice-Enlisted Personnel
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In response to the majority's belief that, whatever the parameters
of the general articles, Levy should have known that his conduct
was unlawful, Justice Stewart answered that "[h]owever foreign to
the military atmosphere of Fort Jackson, the words spoken by him
represented a viewpoint shared by many American citizens."20 5
The idea that criminal sanctions for such conduct should attach
under "meaningless statutes" was beyond the constitutional
pale.
206
The division of the Court in Parker v. Levy roughly approxi-
mated the division in Greer v. Spock. °7 While the issues were dif-
ferent-due process considerations of vagueness and overbreadth
in Parker v. Levy and free speech and public forum issues in Greer
v. Spock-the ultimate questions were similar: To what degree
may a military commander restrict a public airing of political is-
sues on a military installation? In Greer v. Spock, a commander
was given authority to bar all political candidates from a closed
basic training post. In Parker v. Levy, criminal sanctions were im-
posed upon an officer, also on a basic training installation, who ad-
vocated disobedience to orders to fight. In both cases, the military
mission required an unquestioning obedience to orders; and, to the
extent that the candidates in Spock and the officer in Levy caused
military members to question those orders, their activity could be
barred from a military installation.
Those decisions may have been influenced by the facts that both
Fort Dix and Fort Jackson were basic training posts and that the
United States was at war. Yet it was demonstrated in Brown v.
Glines205 and Secretary of the Navy v. Huff209 that those factors
were not controlling. Both cases challenged service regulations
which required the approval of the base commander prior to circu-
lating petitions or distributing printed materials. 210 Both cases
arose after America's disengagement from Vietnam, and, in both
Training (June 24, 1969)).
205. 417 U.S. at 785-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 789 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
207. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). Justice Stewart, the author of Greer v. Spock, joined the dissent
in Parker v. Levy. Justice Marshall had not taken part in Parker, and Justice Douglas had
left the Court before Greer.
208. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
209. 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curiam).
210. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, Reg. No. 31-1(9) (1971); U.S. Dep't of Air Force, Reg. No.
35-15(3)(a)(1) (1970), cited in Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 349-50; Fleet Marine Force Pa-
cific Order No. 5370.3, para. 3(b) (1974), cited in Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. at
455 n.2.
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cases, the regulations were upheld.
Writing for the majority in Glines,211 Justice Powell found the
Air Force regulation in question indistinguishable from the post
regulation upheld in Greer v. Spock. 12 As in Spock, the authority
of the commander to maintain the morale, discipline, and readi-
ness of his troops was a sufficient justification to require prior re-
view of any materials which might cause "possible disruption" in
the ranks.21 3 Although the proposed distribution would have been
made in peacetime, "[1]oyalty, morale, and discipline are essential
attributes of all military service. Combat service obviously requires
them. And members of the Armed Services, wherever they are as-
signed, may be transferred to combat duty or called to deal with
civil disorder or natural disaster. ' 214 Even the federal statute
which prohibits command interference with a service member's
right to petition Congress would not invalidate the regulation.215
That statute was interpreted to protect only direct communication
between service members and legislators. The unrestricted circula-
tion of collective petitions was unprotected under the statute since
it "could imperil [military] discipline. '216 On the authority of
Glines, a similar Marine Corps regulation was upheld the same day
in Huff.217
Justice Brennan dissented in both cases on grounds that the first
amendment rights to express and receive ideas, to communicate
with the government, and to associate with others were impermis-
sibly infringed by the questioned regulations:
The petition is especially suited for the exercise of all of these
rights: It serves as a vehicle of communication; as a classic means of
individual affiliation with ideas or opinions; and as a peaceful yet
effective method of amplifying the views of the individual signers.
Indeed, the petition is a traditionally favored method of political ex-
pression and participation .... Thus, petitioning of officials has
211. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist. 444 U.S. at 348.
212. See supra notes 157-58.
213. Glines, 444 U.S. at 356.
214. Id. at 356-57 n.14 (emphasis added).
215. "No person may restrict any member of an armed force in communicating with a
member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation neces-
sary to the security of the United States." Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 234, 10
U.S.C. § 1034 (1982).
216. 444 U.S. at 360.
217. 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curiam).
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been expressly held to be a right secured by the First
Amendment .2 1
Since prior restraint upon first amendment rights may be used for
censorship, the regulation must fall in the absence of a precisely
articulated governmental interest furthered by the regulation.219
Justice Brennan distinguished Greer v. Spock, which dealt with
the regulation of the speech of civilians on a military installation.
Here, the speech of individuals required to be on the installa-
tion-service members-was involved. Second, alternative public
forums are available to civilians from which to further their ideas.
In the case of service members, however, "when service personnel
are stationed abroad or at sea, the base or warship is very likely
the only place for communication of thoughts. ' 220 Finally, unlike
the regulation which had been neutrally applied in Greer v. Spock
to all political candidates, the denial of the right to circulate peti-
tions and distribute literature in Glines was based upon the "erro-
neous and misleading commentary" contained therein and because
it "impugn[ed] by innuendo the motives and conduct of the Presi-
dent.' ' 221 In sum, the denial had been based upon the content of
the material.
Glines and Huff demonstrate that the Court will safeguard inter-
nal discipline of a military installation even in times when the
United States is not at war. The military commander is afforded a
large measure of discretion in controlling the activity of both civil-
ian and military personnel on the installation, subject to review
within the military system itself and, if necessary, the federal
courts. Absent a judicial finding of an open post as in Flower (only
Fort Sam Houston and the Presidio of San Francisco have been
declared open posts by federal courts) 222 or other activity by which
a public forum has been created,223 the Court will respect com-
218. 444 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
219. Id. at 364-68. Justice Brennan counseled "skepticism" when dealing with claims of
military necessity. To him, the Court was "unduly acquiescent" to the government's expla-
nation of how the blanket restriction, applying to both front-line combat units and rear-
echelon noncombat units, was necessary to national security. Id. at 369-70.
220. Id. at 372 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at 373.
222. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam) (Fort Sam Houston);
CCCO Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Presidio of San
Francisco).
223. Compare United States v. Albertini, 710 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1983), petition for cert.
filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1984) (No. 83-1624) (open house on Air Force base),
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mand determinations of whether the activity in question poses a
threat to the military mission.
C. A Unanimous Vote for the Military System: Chappell v. Wal-
lace (1983)
In Chappell v. Wallace,224 a unanimous Supreme Court refused
to create a right of action against superior commissioned and non-
commissioned officers, based upon alleged violations of the consti-
tutional rights of enlisted service members. It is not remarkable in
itself that the Court reached this decision, but the unamimity of
the decision was somewhat surprising, especially in light of prior
decisions of the Burger Court.
In one of these prior decisions, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 225 a divided Court 22 6
permitted a fourth amendment right of action against federal
agents who were alleged to have violated the constitutional rights
of the plaintiff. In so doing, however, the Court indicated that in
the future, such a remedy would not be available if "special factors
counselling hesitation" were present.2 Although later litigation
would define such "special factors" chiefly in terms of a congres-
sional declaration that such an action should not lie,228 the Court
was unable to find a case in which judicial refusal to imply a rem-
edy was justified. Thus, a cause of action was permitted under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment against a member of
Congress charged with sexual discrimination229 and, under the
eighth amendment, against federal prison officials charged with
failure to provide proper medical care to a federal prisoner.23 0 The
latter decision was particularly startling because a remedy for the
alleged violations already existed under the Federal Tort Claims
with Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.)
(open house but no abandonment of military control), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982).
See supra text accompanying notes 171-79.
224. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
225. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
226. For a discussion of Chief Justice Burger's vigorous dissent in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-
27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), see Kaczynski, The Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence: American and Foreign Approaches Compared, 101 Mm. L. REV. 83, 107-09 (1983).
227. 403 U.S. at 396.
228. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47
(1979).
229. Davis, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
230. Carlson, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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Act. 231
In a related area, the question of the immunity of governmental
officials from suit, the Burger Court had also been reluctant to per-
mit official constitutional wrongs to go unredressed. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes,232 the Court afforded only a qualified immunity to a state
governor. In Butz v. Economou, 23 3 the same standard was applied
to the Secretary of Agriculture. Finally, and most significantly, the
Court decided during the same term as Chappell that, while the
President of the United States was absolutely immune from suit,2 34
only a qualified immunity extended to immediate presidential ad-
visors.23 Although, since 1950, the Court had immunized service
members from common law tort actions brought by other service
members,236 it was difficult to predict that the Court would afford
a military commander greater protection from suit based upon
constitutional tort than that afforded a presidential advisor.2 37
Ultimately, the Court ignored the immunity issue altogether by
deciding the threshold question in favor of the military defendant.
In Chappell, five enlisted sailors complained that they had been
assigned undesirable duties, excessively punished, threatened, and
given low performance ratings because of their race. In federal dis-
trict court, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief and mone-
tary damages from their superiors. The district court dismissed the
suit, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district
court with instructions to determine whether the defendants were
entitled to immunity from suit.238
231. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982). Under the Act, the victim of an enumerated tort com-
mitted by an employee of the federal government within the scope of his or her employment
may file a claim against the United States for a sum certain. Id. § 2675(b). Upon denial of
the claim or inaction by the government, suit may be filed in federal court. Id. § 2675(a).
Determinations of liability are made under the law of the state in which the tort occurred,
just as would be the case with a private individual. Id. § 2674. Punitive damages and pre-
judgment interest are not recoverable under the Act. Id.
232. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The case involved liability for the shooting deaths of Kent State
University students by Ohio State National Guardsmen in 1970.
233. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
234. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
235. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
236. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
237. One clue to the Court's inclinations could possibly have been inferred from the de-
nial of certiorari in Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
972 (1982), on the same day that certiorari was granted in Chappell v. Wallace. In Jaffee,
the Third Circuit had refused to imply a constitutional remedy against military and civilian
officials in favor of a former service member.
238. 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983). The Ninth Circuit
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The Supreme Court focused on the "special factors" language of
Bivens, the need for military discipline, and the existence of statu-
tory remedies for each alleged wrong in finding that a constitu-
tional right of action did not lie. "Special factors counselling hesi-
tation" were found to be present: "In the civilian life of a
democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is
reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel
'without counterpart in civilian life.' ,,239 Response to the com-
mands of a superior "must be virtually reflex with no time for de-
bate or reflection. '240 Therefore, "[tihe special nature of military
life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military of-
ficers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel,
would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing of-
ficers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to
command."
241
In any event, Congress, in exercising its plenary power over the
regulation of the armed forces, had created statutory remedies to
redress the alleged wrongs. Grievances against a commander could
be remedied through Article 138 of the UCMJ.242 Complaints con-
couched the issue in terms both of immunity and of the reviewability of military decisions in
general. The latter issue was governed by the factors articulated in Mindes v. Seaman, 453
F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). Under this test, a reviewing court must first look at the nature of
the legal challenge. If the administrative action allegedly violated the Constitution, statu-
tory authority, or a regulation intended primarily for the protection of the individual, the
court may then consider four factors in determining whether to review the claim:
(1) The nature and strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determina-
tion ....
(2) The potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused.
(3) The type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function
(4) The extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved
Id. at 201. But see Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting Mindes). See
generally Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review of
Military Activities, 70 MiL. L. REv. 1, 61-77 (1975). The Ninth Circuit had remanded Chap-
pell to the district court for a reconsideration of the reviewability of the military decisions
in the case in light of the Mindes factors.
239. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2365.
240. Id. In extreme cases, however, this maxim does not accurately reflect military doc-
trine. Where a soldier is given an order which he believes to be illegal, the soldier is in-
structed first to seek clarification of the order and, if the clarification still describes an Me-
gal act, to disobey the order. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army Training Circular 27-10-1,
Selected Problems in the Law of War 56 (June 1979); see also United States v. Calley, 46
C.M.R. 1131 (C.M.A. 1973).
241. 103 S. Ct. at 2367.
242. A service member who feels wronged by his commanding officer may seek redress
from that commander and, if denied satisfaction, may pursue the matter to the Secretary of
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cerning efficiency reports could be aired before the Board for Cor-
rection of Naval Records,24 the determinations of which are sub-
ject to judicial review.244 Perceived severity in nonjudicial
punishment may be appealed to the next higher commanding of-
ficer.245 In Chappell, the record revealed that only one of the
plaintiffs had availed himself of any portion of this appellate
scheme, and he had done so only in an uninformed manner.24
The sum of these factors represented the "special factors coun-
selling hesitation" of Bivens and warranted the Court's refusal to
create a new cause of action. However, in so doing, the Court ex-
pressly declined to close the courts to suits by military plaintiffs.247
The only commentator to date on the Chappell decision has la-
beled this refusal to dispose of all potential tort suits "particularly
vexing. ' 248 Yet, the Burger Court appears, both by its language
and by its unanimity, to have signalled that any such suit would be
subject to searching judicial scrutiny of its possible effects upon
military discipline and that "counsel wishing to explore the niches
of the Court's holding plays a distinctive long-shot. '249 In any
event, just as Schlesinger v. Councilman had established a respect
for the military justice system, Chappell v. Wallace demonstrated
that the congressional scheme of administrative redress for pur-
ported wrongs would be granted deference, at least where the al-
ternative would interfere with the accomplishment of the military
the service concerned. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982).
243. The Board may correct any military record when "necessary to correct an error or
remove an injustice." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1982).
244. Board decisions may be set aside if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
not based on substantial evidence. See Grieg v. United States, 640 F.2d 1261 (Ct. Cl. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
245. The next higher commander may set aside the entire episode or portions of an epi-
sode of nonjudicial punishment, or may set aside, suspend, or reduce any portion of the
punishment. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982); U.S. Dep't of
Army Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services-Military Justice, para. 3-32 (July 1, 1984).
246. One plaintiff filed an application before the Board for Correction of Naval Records.
The request for relief was denied for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies
and for insufficient evidence. No further action appears to have been taken. 103 S. Ct. at
2367 n.1.
247. The Court expressed no opinion concerning the availability of relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1976), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive individuals of their civil rights.
That issue was remanded to the Ninth Circuit. 103 S. Ct. at 2368 n.3.
248. Zillman, Tort Liability of Military Officers: An Initial Examination of Chappell,
THE ARiY LAW., Aug. 1983, at 29, 33. Left unaddressed were common law tort actions and
suits by civilians against military officers. Id. at 35-37. A suit against a military official in
state court may be removed to the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976).
249. Zillman, supra note 248, at 37.
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mission.
IV. FROM O'Callahan TO Chappell: WHY?
The two passages quoted at the beginning of this article perhaps
best epitomize the respective attitudes of the Warren and Burger
Courts toward the military. From 1969 to 1983, something hap-
pened. Whether it was the result of American disengagement from
an unpopular war, a change in the composition of the Court, re-
forms within the military legal system itself, a developed respect
for other legal systems in general, or a confluence of these factors,
the Supreme Court has come to exhibit a greater deference to mili-
tary decisionmaking processes than during the era of the Warren
Court. This section will examine some of the possible causes for
this change of judicial attitude toward the military.
A. Changes
1. In the Nation
To some extent, the metamorphosis of the Supreme Court's atti-
tude toward the military between 1969 and 1983 mirrors that of
the nation as a whole. In late 1967, President Lyndon Johnson had
dispatched U.S. Army General William Westmoreland, commander
of American forces in Vietnam, on a speaking tour throughout the
United States. General Westmoreland repeatedly trumpeted the
imminence of the collapse of communist forces in Vietnam and
hailed the progress of the American war effort.2 50 But several
months later, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, his optimistic pre-
dictions were telegenically belied as the American public daily
viewed evidence of a communist aggressor that appeared un-
weakened and unbowed.251 While the Tet Offensive was in fact a
devastating defeat for the communist forces,2 52 the credibility and
public respect given pronouncements by the U.S. military estab-
lishment had markedly declined.
The era of O'Callahan was tumultuous for reasons besides the
Vietnam War. Racial tensions flared into open violence in Ameri-
250. This campaign was termed the "Success Offensive" by one author. D. OBERDORFER,
TET! 101 (1971).
251. Id. at 159-60.
252. Id. at 329-31.
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can cities.253 The military, as a reflection of society in general,
could not avoid being affected by this conflict. One commentator
noted that "courts-martial often became the focal point for
problems within the Army caused by racial animosity and dissillu-
sionment with the Vietnam War." 254
Following American disengagement from Vietnam255 and contin-
uing through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, however, percep-
tions of the United States and the United States military, in par-
ticular, changed. From the propagandized "aggressors" in
Indochina of 1964-74, American soldiers increasingly were viewed
as heroes or martyrs. Instead of hurling napalm at Vietnamese vil-
lages, American forces were attempting to rescue their fellow citi-
zens held captive in Iran for over a year by a government which
openly defied an international court decree and ignored the funda-
mental decencies of international relations. 256
Additionally, world events to a large extent bore out the predic-
tions of those who had espoused the "domino theory" as justifica-
tion for American involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, by the end of
the 1970s, the North Vietnamese regular army, now undisguised as
an "indigenous peasant revolt," invaded and overran South Viet-
nam; America evacuated in disgrace. 257 North Vietnam, which had
played the victim so well during the decade of American involve-
ment in the region, also invaded Cambodia 258 and effectively incor-
porated Laos into its sphere of influence.25 9 Thus, by the 1980s, the
purported victim of American war crimes was a regional power
with hegemony over former French Indochina. The United States
had been powerless to prevent it.
The elimination of the draft also helped quell a restive American
public's fears about the military. No longer were Americans asked
to give their sons to an unpopular cause. Well before 1983, the
armed services were composed entirely of enlistees who had chosen
253. See, e.g., The City: Guerrilla Summer?, TIm, June 27, 1969, at 16; Spring of Discon-
tent, id., Feb. 21, 1969, at 36; Rampage & Restraint, id., Apr. 19, 1968, at 15.
254. Howell, TDS: The Establishment of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, 100 MI.
L. REv. 4, 16 (1983).
255. For an account of the final negotiations surrounding the United States' withdrawal
from Vietnam, see A. IsAAcs, WrrHouT HONOR: DEFEAT IN VMTNAM AND CAMBODIA (1983).
256. See, e.g., A Mission Comes to Grief in Iran, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1980, at 24.
257. See generally A DAwsoN, 55 DAYS: THE FALL OF SOUTH VmTNAht (1977).
258. See J. HARRISON, THE ENDLESS WAR: FIFTY YEARS OF STRUGGLE IN VmTNA 297-300
(1982).
259. See id. at 297-98.
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to join.2 60
The results of the 1980 Presidential election indicated that the
American citizens recognized a need to restore American military
strength. Campaigning on a platform of returning the United
States to a position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Ronald
Reagan handily won the election, capturing forty-four of the fifty
states.2"' The Congress that assumed office with him agreed that
military expenditures would have to be increased; the only debate
concerned the percentage of increase." '
In sum, the American military establishment was no longer rec-
ognized by the American public as an instrument of aggression
that forcibly committed its sons to a senseless war. Indeed, the
military was increasingly seen as the instrument that the Founding
Fathers had designed it to be, an instrument of defense to be sup-
ported in its efforts to instill discipline and to train its troops for
the necessities of combat. It was in this spirit that the United
States finally honored its Vietnam dead with a memorial in the
nation's capital. The Supreme Court was also affected by the na-
tional change of perspective.
2. In the Court
Undoubtedly, the changes in personnel on the Supreme Court
affected the attitudinal change from O'Callahan to Chappell. By
1983, Justice Douglas, the author of O'Callahan, and two of those
who had joined in the O'Callahan majority, Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Black, were gone from the Court. 63 Gone, too, were
two dissenters, Justices Harlan 264 and Stewart.2 65 In their places
were Chief Justice Burger266 and Justices Powell,267 Rehnquist, ' 8
Blackmun,269 Stevens,270 and O'Connor. 7' One O'Callahan dis-
260. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1976) (ending the draft after July 1, 1973).
261. See Reagan Coast-to-Coast, TIME, Nov. 17, 1980, at 22, 23.
262. See Reagan Gets a G.O.P. Senate, id. at 55; The House Is Not a Home, id. at 61.
263. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 394
(1979) (Douglas); id. at 10 (Warren); id. at 157-58 (Black).
264. See id. at 158.
265. See Surprise from the Swing Man, TIME, June 29, 1981, at 48.
266. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 263, at 22.
267. See id. at 160-63.
268. See id. at 161-63.
269. See id. at 86-88.
270. See id. at 400-02.
271. See The Brethren's First Sister, TIME, July 20, 1981, at 8.
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senter, Justice White, remained on the Court, as did two members
of the O'Callahan majority, Justices Brennan and Marshall. The
four Nixon appointees, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mun, Powell, and Rehnquist, were touted as "strict construction-
ists" at the time of their appointments.272 Indeed, of the four, only
Justice Powell in Flower and Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun in Parisi, have ever voted against the military. The phi-
losophy of the Burger Court toward the military will be discussed
later in this article.2 73 At this point, however, it should be noted
that the personalities of the members of the Court have unques-
tionably played a role in the change of judicial position toward the
military.
3. In the Military Justice System
Starting at the time of the O'Callahan decision and continuing
for over a decade, reforms of the UCMJ and the Manual for
Courts-Martial were taking place. Additionally, the administration
of military justice itself was being changed. In each case, the
changes reflected a "civilianization" of the system and a tendency
to imitate, as closely as the military mission permitted, the prac-
tice and procedures of federal district courts.
a. The Military Justice Act of 1968
Even prior to the condemnation of the military justice system in
O'Callahan, Congress had acted to ameliorate some of the per-
ceived inequities of the system. The Military Justice Act of 1968,274
signed by President Johnson on October 24, 1968 and effective Au-
gust 1, 1969, marked the first major revision of the military crimi-
nal justice system since the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950. The
Act effected six major changes in military law and procedures:
(1). Counsel. Under the UCMJ, an accused had a right to coun-
sel in general courts-martial, the level of court with authority to
sentence an accused to substantial periods of confinement, includ-
ing life imprisonment, 275 and to hand down the death penalty.2 76 In
272. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 263, at 11 (Burger); id. at 87 (Black-
mun); id. at 161 (Powell and Rehnquist).
273. See infra text accompanying notes 353-84.
274. Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968) (codified at scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
275. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 894, 899-902, 904, 913, 918, 920 (1982).
276. See, e.g., id. §§ 894, 899-902, 904, 906, 913, 918, 920 (1982).
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the inferior special courts-martial, in which the maximum punish-
ment might include a bad-conduct discharge and confinement for
as long as six months, no such right to counsel existed.
The Act corrected this disparity. In special courts-martial em-
powered to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge as a part of the pun-
ishment, the accused was to be afforded legally trained counsel.178
Moreover, absent severe military exigency, the trial would be held
before a military judge independent of the commander who had
sent the case to trial. Additionally, even if the court were not au-
thorized to discharge the accused,7 9 legal counsel was to be pro-
vided unless military considerations made it impossible. A sup-
porter of the Act noted, "It is sheer fantasy. . . to contend that a
veterinary officer or a transportation officer who has read a few
pages of the Uniform Code and the Manual for Courts-Martial
can adequately represent a defendant in such proceeding. '28 0 In
practice, an accused is always provided counsel before all special
courts-martial.2" l
(2). Military Judges. In response to criticism that the officer pre-
siding at a court-martial may be under the influence of a com-
mander with an interest in the outcome of the case, the Act cre-
ated the title "military judge" and required that the judge be
legally trained and certified as competent to preside over courts-
martial by The Judge Advocate General of the service in question.
The military judge was intended to "preside over courts-martial to
which . . . assigned much as a federal district court judge does,
with roughly equivalent powers and functions."'2 82 A military judge
was to be provided for all general courts-martial and, absent mili-
tary exigency, for all special courts-martial empowered to give a
277. Id. § 819 (1982).
278. Under current standards a person will be certified as a military defense counsel only
if admitted to practice law before the highest court of a state or before a federal court. U.S.
Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services-Military Justice, para. 6-3g (July 1, 1984)
(citing Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 27(b), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1982)).
279. For a special court-martial to be empowered to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge, the
court must have been convened by a general court-martial convening authority, a court re-
porter must have been detailed, qualified defense counsel must have been provided, and a
military judge must preside. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1982).
280. Ervin, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 Ma. L. REv. 77, 85 (1969).
281. Even an attorney who is in the military but not assigned to the Judge Advocate
General's Corps may not be detailed as counsel without permission of the Office of The
Judge Advocate General. Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, Personnel,
Plans and Training Office, JAGC Personnel Policies, para. 9-1b (Oct. 1983).
282. Ervin, supra note 280, at 88-89.
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bad-conduct discharge. In practice, military judges preside over all
general and special courts-martial. Indeed, since the Act, each ser-
vice has created a judiciary independent of both local commanders
and that command's legal office; military judges are evaluated only
by other members of the independent trial judiciary.8 3
(3). Procedures. Various procedural rules of court-martial were
refocused to "bring. . .[the court-martial] more in line with crim-
inal proceedings in federal district courts. '284 The military judge
was permitted to accept guilty pleas and to dispose of interlocutory
pretrial motions, such as those involving the suppression of physi-
cal evidence or confessions, out of the hearing of the court-mem-
bers. Moreover, an accused was afforded a choice of forum to hear
his case. The case could be tried before a court consisting entirely
of officers or, if the accused was an enlisted member, before a court
with a composition of at least one-third enlisted members. Finally,
an accused could waive trial before court-members and opt instead
to be tried by the military judge alone. In the latter case, contrary
to federal procedures, the consent of the government to the waiver
is not required.
(4). Command Influence. Although Article 37 of the UCMJ had
forbidden commanders to take disciplinary action against court-
members on account of their service on a court-martial panel, per-
ceptions of command influence on court-members persisted. The
Military Justice Act sought to protect both commanders and de-
fense counsel further by decreeing that other adverse action, such
as the preparation of an unfavorable fitness report, was also forbid-
den when motivated by the officer's involvement in a court-martial
proceeding.
(5). Summary Courts-Martial. The rights of the accused before
a summary court-martial and the procedures such a tribunal in-
volves have already been noted in the discussion of Middendorf v.
Henry.28 5 It was the 1968 Act which gave the accused the right to
decline trial by summary court-martial and to seek instead a trial
in which the rights to counsel and choice of forum attach.
(6). Post-Conviction Procedures. The Act empowered a com-
mander to defer serving a sentence to confinement pending appeal,
283. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services-Military Justice, para.
8-5e (July 1, 1984).
284. Ervin, supra note 280, at 91.
285. 425 U.S. 25 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
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a form of "release on bail" 2ee previously unauthorized under the
Code. The time period for petitioning for a new trial was extended
from one to two years and applied to all cases, not merely to those
in which a serious penalty had been imposed.281 Finally, the inter-
mediate military appellate tribunal, the Boards of Review, was
rechristended the "Court of Military Review" and was now consti-
tuted much as is a'federal circuit court of appeals. The court was
administered by a chief judge, who was to organize the other ap-
pellate judges into panels. The Act encouraged both uniformity of
decision288 and professional independence.8
b. The Military Rules of Evidence
Pursuant to his statutory authority to prescribe procedures for
the trial of courts-martial and to insure that, where possible, those
procedures were similar to those practiced in federal courts,2 e° on
March 12, 1980, President Carter promulgated an executive order
amending the Manual for Courts-Martial.291 Effective September
1, 1980, the order adopted the Military Rules of Evidence which,
with certain exceptions, e2 mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Therefore, the complaint of Justice Douglas in O'Callahan that
"[s]ubstantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in
military trials '2 3 was remedied.
286. Ervin, supra note 280, at 95.
287. Heretofore, the petition for a new trial could be made only in cases involving
sentences which included death, dismissal, a punitive discharge, or confinement at hard Ia-
bor for one year or more. Id. at 96.
288. Id. at 97. But see United States v. Chilcote, 20 C.M.A. 283, 43 C.M.R. 123 (1971);
Allen, The Precedential Value of Decisions of the Court of Military Review and the Need
for En Banc Reconsideration, THE ARMY LAW., Mar. 1983, at 16 (discussing fact that en
banc reconsideration to resolve conflicts among panels of the Courts of Military Review is
not authorized). This latter problem was resolved by section 7(b) of the Military Justice Act
of 1983, 97 Stat. 1402 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 866(a)), which permits en banc reconsidera-
tion by the Courts of Military Review.
289. Ervin, supra note 280, at 97.
290. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982).
291. Exec. Order No. 12,198, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1980).
292. For example, the Military Rules discuss the procedures for the admission of evidence
obtained through confessions, searches and seizures, and inspections. MIL. R. Evm. 301-21.
The Military Rules also broach the question of privileges, an area unaddressed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. MIL. R. Evw. 501-12.
293. 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969) (footnote omitted). For an analysis of the Military Rules of
Evidence, see S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI, & D. ScHLEuTR, MILrARY RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL (1981); Symposium, The Military Rules of Evidence, THE ARMY LAW., May 1980, at
1.
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c. An Independent Defense Corps
From the days of O'Callahan until the mid-1970s, both the pros-
ecutor and the defense counsel in courts-martial worked directly
for the commander's legal advisor, the staff judge advocate, and
thus, indirectly, for the commander himself. At best, this situation
created the appearance of improper influence upon the profes-
sional activity and zealous advocacy of a defense counsel on behalf
of a client. In some instances, actual impropriety occurred.294 This
inherent conflict of interests led both the Navy and the Air Force
in 1974 to establish defense organizations separate from the com-
mand which the individual counsel serviced. In 1980, after a two-
year test period, the Army followed suit.29 Organized similarly to
the independent judiciary, defense counsel were answerable only to
other defense counsel.298 Insulation from the command was com-
plete; evaluation reports or disciplinary action could be issued only
by the independent defense supervisory chain.297
B. Respect For Other Systems
In part, the willingness of the Burger Court to defer to the mili-
tary justice and administrative processes reflects the Court's in-
creased respect for other legal systems. During the period of the
Burger Court, the integrity of state criminal and federal adminis-
trative schemes has not been disturbed and those processes have
294. See generally Memorandum from Comm. on Defense Counsel to the Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Army, Subject- Defense Counsel Program (May 12, 1958), cited in Howell,
supra note 254, at 13 n.35.
295. Fact Sheet: US Army Trial Defense Service, THE ARMY LAW., Jan. 1981, at 27. As
the largest branch of the armed forces, the Army decided to be especially cautious in imple-
menting a separate defense program. On May 15, 1978, a test program of the separate de-
fense corps was initiated at six training posts within the continental United States. On Sep-
tember 1, 1979, the test was extended to other Army units in the continental United States,
Alaska, and Hawaii. On December 1, 1979, the program was implemented in Germany and,
one month later, in Korea as well. Finally, on November 7, 1980, the Army Chief of Staff,
General Edward C. Meyer, approved the Trial Defense Service as a permanent Army organ-
ization. Howell, supra note 254, at 35-46. See also Park, The Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Corps, 1975-1982, 96 MiL. L. REv. 5, 34-38 (1982).
296. See U.S. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services-Military Justice, ch. 6 (July
1, 1984).
297. Trial defense counsel in the Army are evaluated by the senior defense counsel of
their office, by the regional defense counsel who oversees several trial defense offices in a
geographic area, and by the Executive Officer of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, in
Falls Church, Va. Disciplinary authority is vested in the Commander, U.S. Army Legal Ser-
vices Agency, the parent organization of the Trial Defense Service, also located at Falls
Church, Va. Id. para. 6-3.
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Federal courts are generally prohibited from interfering with the
processes of state courts.298 In 1908, the Supreme Court in Ex
Parte Young, 29 9 recognized an exception to this general rule and
held that, at least when a federal injunctive action has been com-
menced prior to the initiation of a state criminal prosecution under
an allegedly unconstitutional statute, the federal courts possess the
authority to enjoin the state prosecution.300 However, shortly after
Young the Court made it clear that such injunctions would issue
only "under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of ir-
reparable loss is both great and immediate."30 1 The Court thereaf-
ter consistently affirmed refusals to enjoin criminal prosecutions
which had been brought "lawfully and in good faith,"3 2 albeit
under the authority of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. 03
In 1965, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,°4 the Warren Court upheld a
federal injunction against enforcement of a state statute which reg-
ulated freedom of expression. In Dombrowski, the petitioners as-
serted that the state statutes, the Louisiana Subversive Activities
and Communist Control Law0 5 and the Communist Propaganda
Control Law,308 were overbroad. Furthermore, they claimed that
298. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). See also
id. § 1341 (no injunction of state agency rate orders).
299. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
300. Id. at 162-65. The central issue in Young was whether the eleventh amendment for-
bade suit where, although the state was not a party, the suit was directed against a state
official charged with enforcing the laws of the state. To avoid the issue and permit the suit,
the Court created the legal fiction that the official is "stripped of his official or representa-
tive character" when seeking to enforce a statute in violation of the Constitution. Conse-
quently, the suit is a personal one against the official rather than one against the state. Id.
at 163.
301. Feener v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926).
302. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
303. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Williams v. Miller, 317
U.S. 599 (1942); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
304. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
305. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358-:374 (West 1976)
306. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390-:390.8 (West 1976).
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the past conduct of state and local officials had evidenced a pat-
tern of harassment against the petitioners in order to deter their
efforts to secure civil rights for Blacks in the state. 07
Heavily influenced by the evidence of "the chilling effect on free
expression" resulting from the state's activity, the Supreme Court
found abstention by the lower court s to have been inappropriate.
The Court determined "that a substantial loss of or impairment of
freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state
court's determination and ultimate review in this Court of any ad-
verse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irrepa-
rable injury."309 Thus, where a party can allege the threat of bad-
faith prosecution under a state statute regulating freedom of ex-
pression, a federal court is permitted to exercise its equitable
power to enjoin the state official from commencing the prosecution.
Dombrowski was consistent with Young; in neither case was the
federal court asked to intervene in a pending state prosecution. A
different situation, however, was presented to the Burger Court in
Younger v. Harris.3 10 In Younger, the accused had been indicted
under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.3 11 Thereafter, in
federal court, he sought to enjoin further prosecution, alleging that
both the state prosecution and the statute itself chilled the exer-
cise of his first amendment rights. Relying on Dombrowski, a
three-judge federal court issued the injunction. 312
Noting the longstanding policy against federal intervention in
state proceedings, the Supreme Court found "that the Dombrowski
decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doc-
trines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of
307. The complaint alleged a pattern of unlawful arrests, searches and seizures, and
threats of additional prosecutions. 380 U.S. at 487-88.
308. The court in question was a three-judge federal district court convened to rule upon
the constitutionality of the state statutes. Id. at 482. Since 1965, the jurisdiction of such
courts has been limited to questions involving the apportionment of congressional districts.
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982).
309. 380 U.S. at 486.
310. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
311. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982).
312. 281 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Others, against whom charges were not pending,
joined Harris in the suit, claiming that the statute interfered with their freedom of expres-
sion. The Supreme Court quickly disposed of their claims: "Whatever right Harris, who is
being prosecuted under the state syndicalism law may have, [the others]. . . cannot share it
with him." 401 U.S. at 42. Their feelings of inhibition in the face of the statute were insuffi-
cient to permit them to invoke the equity powers of the federal court. Id.
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injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions."'313 Absent a
showing of bad-faith prosecution, the mere existence of an alleg-
edly unconstitutional statute and the allegation of a "chilling ef-
fect" on the rights of free expression would not alone justify fed-
eral court interference in a pending state prosecution. Under those
circumstances the accused would be required to present his consti-
tutional claims in his defense to the state prosecution, subject to
review of adverse determinations in the state and, ultimately, fed-
eral court systems.3 14
In Younger, the Court assumed that the state trial and appellate
court system could adequately entertain and, if appropriate, vindi-
cate the accused's constitutional claims; the Burger Court would
not impugn the integrity of the state criminal justice process. Simi-
lar considerations were present in Schlesinger v. Councilman,31 5 in
which the Court likewise refused to intervene in the military jus-
tice system. In both cases, whether on the bases of comity, federal-
ism, or prudential concerns, the Burger Court opted to avoid pre-
mature intervention in a scheme in which the Court believed that
the accused's claim could be fully aired and appropriately
adjudicated.
b. Habeas Corpus
Federal law grants a person held "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" the right to
petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.31 6 If the re-
spondent is unable to show that the petitioner is lawfully in cus-
tody, the court may order the petitioner released. 17 Although first
deemed to be available only for attacks upon the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court,18 it is now clear that habeas corpus may be
sought for claims of disregard for any constitutional right of an
accused. 9 Habeas corpus is available in federal court to review
313. 401 U.S. at 53.
314. Id. at 54.
315. 420 U.S. 738 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 94-110.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982).
317. The application for a writ of habeas corpus must identify only the applicant, the
person who has custody over him, and the claim or authority for that detention. Id. § 2242.
The judge would thereafter require the respondent to the writ to show cause why the writ
should not be granted. Id. § 2243.
318. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 307 (1855).
319. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
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persons in custody by reason of a judgment of the state court, pro-
vided, however, that the petitioner has exhausted all remedies
available to him in the state system.320
The existence of such a mechanism is inevitably a source of fric-
tion between the state and federal court system. In 1963, in Fay v.
Noia,321 the Warren Court greatly exacerbated that inherent fric-
tion by permitting federal courts to entertain the habeas corpus
petition of a defendant who had failed to appeal his conviction in
the state court system. Although federal judges possess discretion
to refuse habeas relief in such a case, the standard for exercise of
that discretion is high:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or
otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether
for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be de-
scribed as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is
open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief.... A
choice made by counsel and not participated in by the petitioner
does not automatically bar relief.322
The Court concluded by finding no "deliberate bypass" by Noia
that would preclude habeas relief.32 3
The "deliberate bypass" rule of waiver remained the law
throughout the remaining tenure of the Warren Court. Not long
after Warren Burger became Chief Justice, however, a process of
retrenchment began. In Davis v. United States,3 24 a federal pris-
oner sought to attack first by writ of habeas corpus the composi-
tion of the grand jury which had indicted him. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure require that such an attack must be made
by motion before trial, it will otherwise be deemed waived. 25 Re-
jecting the "deliberate bypass" rule of Fay v. Noia, the Court
found a valid waiver of the motion and barred habeas relief absent
a showing of cause for noncompliance with the rule and a showing
320. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
321. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
322. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
323. Id. The Court did note that Noia had been faced with the "grisly choice" either of
not appealing and keeping his existing sentence or of appealing through the state system.
Were he to be granted a new trial, the death penalty would become a possibility. Id. at 440.
324. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
325. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2).
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of actual prejudice.326
Three years later, in Francis v. Henderson,327 the Court ac-
corded the same deference to a similar state rule of procedure. In-
deed, in Francis, Fay v. Noia was cited only for the proposition
that federal courts possess the power to "forego the exercise of...
[their] habeas corpus power" when required by "considerations of
comity and concerns for the orderly administrating of criminal
justice. 328
Finally, in Wainwright v. Sykes, s9 the Burger Court refused to
entertain a habeas challenge to an "involuntary" confession when
the accused had failed to raise the issue at trial in violation of a
state "contemporaneous objection" rule. Finding that the state
rule served valid governmental purposes,3 ' the Court extended the
Francis "cause-and-prejudice" standard to cases in which the ac-
cused has failed to take advantage of the opportunity provided by
state procedures to object at some stage of the proceeding.33 1 The
"deliberate bypass" rule, criticized by the Court as "sweeping lan-
guage, ' 3 2 was found to have been "limited by Francis'3 3 and was
condemned as encouraging "'sand bagging' on the part of defense
lawyers. 33 4 The Court hoped that an awareness by the accused
and their attorneys that "contemporaneous objection" rules would
be enforced in federal and state courts would encourage full litiga-
tion in the state courts, thus, perhaps, achieving a more equitable
result and returning to state criminal proceedings a greater degree
of finality.
In Engle v. Isaac,33 5 the "cause-and-prejudice" standard was ex-
326. 411 U.S. at 238-40. But see id. at 245 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Citing Fay v. Noia
only in a footnote, Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas,
found that in none of the earlier cases "did the prisoner show his failure to object was not
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
327. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
328. Id. at 539. Only Justice Brennan dissented and would have held to the "deliberate
bypass" standard. Id. at 542-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Neither Justice Marshall nor Jus-
tice Stevens took part in the decision.
329. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
330. The Court found that the rule enabled an accurate record to be made when wit-
nesses' recollections are the freshest and that enforcement of the rule might lead to the
exclusion of evidence, "thereby making a major contribution to finality in criminal litiga-
tion." Id. at 88-90.
331. Id. at 90-91.
332. Id. at 87-88.
333. Id. at 85.
334. Id. at 89.
335. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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tended to an accused's failure to object to a jury instruction as re-
quired by the Ohio "contemporaneous objection" rule.336
Further respect for the state court's processes was evidenced in
Stone v. Powell,33 in which an accused had unsuccessfully litigated
a motion at trial to suppress evidence discovered as a result of an
arrest made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. After an un-
successful appeal in the state system, Powell successfully obtained
habeas relief in federal court.38' The Supreme Court reversed.
Finding that, unlike violations of the fifth and sixth amendments,
violations of the fourth amendment do not "impugn the integrity
of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently un-
reliable, 339 the Court refused to suppress evidence in a collateral
action when the state had provided the accused with "an opportu-
nity for a full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim
.... "340 Thus, the Court relegated primarily to the state courts
the responsibility for hearing and deciding fourth amendment is-
sues, subject only to direct Supreme Court review.
Finally, in Rose v. Lundy,3 41 the accused submitted a federal
habeas corpus petition based on claims upon only some of which
the state remedies had been exhausted. The Supreme Court held
that the entire habeas petition should have been dismissed by the
federal district court. The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is
designed to advance the interests of comity, under which the state
court system should be given the initial opportunity to review and
perhaps correct any issue which might otherwise constitute part of
a request for collateral relief. The petitioner in Rose v. Lundy was
given the choice of returning to the state courts to litigate the
unexhausted claim or amending his federal habeas petition to de-
lete it. 34 2 Whichever option is chosen, the federal courts are hereaf-
ter foreclosed from reviewing any issue upon which the state courts
have not finally ruled.
336. Id. at 124-25. See also United States y. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (finding a waiver
in the failure to object to a jury instruction under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)).
337. 428 U.S. 465, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
338. 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
339. 428 U.S. at 479 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)).
Rather, the purpose of an exclusionary rule is to deter constitutional violations. The deter-
rence factor present in the exclusion of evidence on collateral review was found to be negli-
gible. 428 U.S. at 488-89.
340. 428 U.S. at 482.
341. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
342. Id. at 520-22.
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2. Administrative Agencies
Federal courts will usually defer to the expertise of federal ad-
ministrative agencies when the agencies act within their fields of
expertise. 43 Indeed, by statute, federal courts are generally limited
in the scope of their review of administrative decisions to deter-
mining only whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious or an
abuse of discretion. 44 In cases where opinions could differ as to the
wisdom of a particular decision in an area within the agency's com-
petence, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.3 45 In sum, the legislative scheme of specialized agencies
designed to oversee regulation of specific areas of activity is rarely
disturbed.
Nor would a different result obtain when the wrong complained
of was of constitutional dimension, at least when the complainant
was not a participant in the regulated activity, but rather a mem-
ber of the agency itself. In Bush v. Lucas,346 the plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, al-
leged that he had been demoted and reassigned after making
remarks critical of the facility at which he worked. Bush appealed
unsuccessfully to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority and to
the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board. Bush was
successful before the Board, which ordered him reinstated with
back pay.
While pursuing his administrative appeals, Bush brought suit
against his former superior, seeking damages for violations of his
first amendment rights.34 After Bush's tortuous journey through
the federal court system, 8 the Supreme Court refused to imply a
343. See, e.g., Udall v. Taiman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944).
344. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). In some cases, the reviewing court is directed to conduct
a de novo review. See id. §§ 552(a)(3)(B) (review of decision to withhold records under the
Freedom of Information Act), 552(a)(g)(1) (decision to release records under the Privacy
Act).
345. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIvE LAW TEXT §§ 29.02 - 29.03 (1959).
346. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983).
347. Id. at 2407. Bush also sued for defamation. The district court and the Fifth Circuit
found the defendants absolutely immune from such a suit. 598 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1979). The
issue was thereafter narrowed to the constitutional question.
348. Initially, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's determination that no liabil-
ity existed. The Supreme Court found applicable the reasoning in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14 (1980), in which the Court decided that federal prison officials ought to be afforded only
qualified immunity from suit. 446 U.S. 914 (1980). On remand, the Fifth Circuit again ruled
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judicial remedy to redress the purported constitutional violations.
For purposes of the decision, the Court assumed that a violation
of Bush's constitutional rights had occurred and that monetary
damages would more effectively compensate for the violation than
would reinstatement under the regulatory scheme." 9 Nonetheless,
the Court found "special factors counselling hesitation" in creating
a new remedy. The Pendleton Act3 50 (the original civil service act),
its subsequent amendments, and the regulations promulgated to
implement them evidence "an elaborate remedial system that has
been constructed step by step, with careful attention to the con-
flicting policy considerations. 3 51 Because these "comprehensive
procedural and substantive provisions [gave federal employees]
• . .meaningful remedies against the United States," the Court ex-
pressed reluctance to create a new constitutional remedy in addi-
tion to the congressionally created structure. 52
Thus, it appears that Chappell v. Wallace was not written in a
vacuum. In the federal administrative realm, even without the ad-
ditional factor in Chappell of the need for military discipline, the
Court chose to respect a statutory system of redress of grievances
and declined to superimpose a constitutional cause of action upon
it. As the Burger Court had chosen to respect the integrity of the
state criminal justice systems, so, too, it would respect the integrity
of the administrative system created by the civil service acts. The
deference given the military justice and administrative systems in
cases such as Schlesinger v. Councilman and Chappell v. Wallace
may be seen as a part of this general judicial philosophy.
V. THE BURGER COURT AND THE MILITARY. CONSTRUCTING A
JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
In a 1962 address to the faculty and students of the New York
University School of Law, Chief Justice Earl Warren outlined the
Supreme Court philosophy on the protection of individual rights of
military personnel.353 In language that might reasonably be mis-
against the plaintiff. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981).
349. 103 S. Ct. at 2408.
350. Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (current version in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., & 40 U.S.C. (1982)).
351. 103 S. Ct. at 2416.
352. Id. at 2416-17.
353. Address by Earl Warren to the New York University Law Center (Feb. 1, 1962),
printed in Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1962).
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taken for that of a Burger Court majority, in sharp contrast to the
language of the Vietnam-era Warren Court in O'Callahan, the
Chief Justice expounded a judicial "hands off" policy concerning
military activity directed toward service members.354 Although not-
ing that the 1953 decision in Burns v. Wilson355 permitted federal
habeas corpus review of allegations that a court-martial had denied
an accused his or her fundamental rights, the Chief Justice related
that extremely few cases had reached the courts since Burns. To
explain the infrequency of such claims, Chief Justice Warren
pointed with admiration to the role of the Court of Military Ap-
peals as an "effective guarantor" of respect for the constitutional
rights of the service members. 56 In language prescient of Schles-
inger v. Councilman,3 57 he remarked that the federal courts were
"ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any
particular intrusion upon military authority might have. Many of
the problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the
problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal. '35 8
Now, after almost a decade and a half of Burger Court decisions
concerning various aspects of the military, it may be possible to
articulate the present Court's philosophy toward cases involving
the armed forces. The construct will inevitably be imperfect: Ex-
cept in Relford 59 and Chappell,360 Justices Brennan and Marshall
have dissented in every case in which the result favored the mili-
tary. Although Justice Stevens voted with the Court in Chappell,
he dissented on matters of statutory construction in Glines61 and
Huff. 62 Justice O'Connor is as yet a relatively untested jurispru-
dent in military matters. While she voted with the unanimous
Court in Chappell, her vote joined those of both the philosophical
activists, Justices Brennan and Marshall, and the conservatives,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. However, it appears
that a majority composed of at least Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist can be mustered in
support of the philosophy outlined below.
354. Id. at 186.
355. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
356. Warren, supra note 353, at 188-89.
357. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
358. Warren, supra note 353, at 187.
359. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
360. 102 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
361. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
362. 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curiam).
[Vol. 18:235
THE BURGER COURT AND THE MILITARY
Initially, it should be noted that the Burger Court places great
emphasis on the military as a community separate and distinct
from that which lies outside the gate of the military installation.
Throughout the military cases of the Burger Court are repeated
references to the needs for unquestioning response to orders and
an atmosphere conducive to training service members to so re-
spond. 3 63 The introduction into the military community of a dis-
ruptive influence, whether a political campaign by Benjamin
Spock,38 ' Captain Levy's peculiar views,38 5 or a lawsuit against a
commander, 3 68 will be regarded by the Court with a skeptical eye.
Additionally, in the military matters the Court will condone the
application of a rule different from that existing in the civilian
community when that rule can be presented as necessary to fur-
ther the military mission. Thus, while a lawsuit against a presiden-
tial advisor will be countenanced, 67 a suit against a military com-
mander will not be.3"'
Unlike the five-member majority of the Warren Court that sup-
ported the scathing language of Justice Douglas in O'Callahan, the
Burger Court affords a great measure of respect to the military jus-
tice system. The Court, in Relford v. Commandant,3 69 tread lightly
upon the language of O'Callahan; it only footnoted legal literature
critical of O'Callahan3 7 0 and nowhere cited the language of Justice
Douglas. It was with Gosa v. Mayden37 1 that the Court almost
apologetically cited Douglas's language37 2 and began to rehabilitate
the military justice system. By Schlesinger v. Councilman,37 3 the
Court had begun to speak of the expertise of the military court
system, particularly the Court of Military Appeals, and to analo-
363. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983) ("Ihe habit of immedi-
ate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for
debate or reflection."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental neces-
sity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render
permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside
it.").
364. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 157-70.
365. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 180-206.
366. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 224-
49.
367. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
368. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. 2362.
369. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
370. Id. at 357 n.3.
371. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
372. Id. at 680-81.
373. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
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gize that system favorably to state court systems 3714 and federal ad-
ministrative agencies.375 Although the dissenting opinions continu-
ally hearkened back to the indictments in O'Callahan,37 6 the
majorities in these cases were content to permit military courts to
resolve military issues, subject, upon exhaustion of remedies, to
collateral review in the federal courts.
When the military deals with civilians, the Court will require
only the evenhanded application of a rule with some nexus to the
military mission. In this regard, the neutral application of the reg-
ulation concerning political activity on a military base in Greer v.
Spock37 appears to have mollified the Justices who had voted dif-
ferently in Flower.3 7  Spock had been denied access to Fort Dix,
just as had every political candidate before him, and had been ex-
cluded for what the Court found to be a good reason. Moreover,
the Court's belief that a military installation may not be constitu-
tionally equated with a city street or municipal park was demon-
strated both by Greer v. Spock and possibly by the denial of cer-
tiorari in Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air
Force.37 '9 Attempts to breach the wall of a politically neutral mili-
tary will be resisted by the Burger Court.
Where, however, the Court feels that the military has not come
to court with "clean hands," it will cast a skeptical eye upon the
armed forces. Parisi v. Davidson5 0 was such a case. Similarly,
where there is evidence of arbitrary or discriminatory application
of a regulation governing speech, unlike the situation in Greer v.
Spock, the Burger Court might be persuaded to find a basis to in-
validate the military action.
During the tenure of the Warren Court, vast inroads into the
authority of the military were made."" The Burger Court has not
374. Id. at 754.
375. Id. at 756.
376. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 694 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
377. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
378. 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam).
379. 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982).
380. 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
381. The earlier military jurisdiction cases of the Warren Court, such as United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), were not
inexorable expositions of the law. Chief Justice Warren was initially disposed at least to
permit the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over the discharged service member in Toth
for offenses committed while on active duty. At the behest of the potential dissenters, how-
ever, the case was postponed for reargument. By then, Warren had changed his mind, Jus-
tice Clark had followed him, and Justice Harlan had joined the Court. This situation cre-
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reversed and is unlikely to reverse these decisions. There have, for
example, been three opportunities to overrule O'Callahan:
Relford,382 Gosa v. Mayden,55 and Schlesinger v. Councilman.84
Instead, within the general framework of the Warren Court deci-
sions, the Burger Court has chosen to distinguish the facts and to
defer to and respect military rules and procedures where a plausi-
ble argument can be made that those rules and procedures deserve
respect. Chappell indicates that this approach is alive and well.
Military commanders have generally been granted authority by the
Court to control their installations and charges. Where rational,
nondiscriminatory applications of that authority are present, mili-
tary determinations will not be upset by the Burger Court.
VI. THE BURGER COURT AND THE MILITARY: THE FUTURE
Wickham v. Hall, decided by the Fifth Circuit on June 10,
1983,385 may be the next military case before the Burger Court.
Like Relford,386 the issue is jurisdiction; however, unlike any case
decided by the Supreme Court in over two decades, the issue con-
cerns the in personam jurisdiction of a court-martial to try an os-
tensibly discharged member of the armed forces.
Article 3(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides in
part:
Each person discharged from the armed forces who is later charged
with having fraudulently obtained his discharge is ... subject to
trial by court-martial on that charge and is after apprehension sub-
ject to [the UCMJ] . . . while in the custody of the armed forces for
that trial. Upon conviction of that charge he is subject to trial by
court-martial for all offenses ... committed before the fraudulent
ated a six-to-three majority for denial of jurisdiction. B. SCHWARTZ & S. LESHER, INSIDE THE
WARREN COURT, 1953-1969, 144-46 (1983). Chief Justice Warren later explained that a dif-
ferent result in Toth potentially would have affected the status of over 22,500,000 veterans.
Warren, supra note 353, at 194-95. Concerning the denial of court-martial jurisdiction over
civilian employees accompanying the armed forces overseas, as in McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960), and Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), the
Chief Justice observed that, if the military were concerned about discipline, it could have
soldiers perform the work. Warren, supra note 353, at 195.
382. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
383. 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
384. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
385. 706 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1983).
386. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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discharge. 87
Article 83 of the UCMJ makes the fraudulent procurement of a
discharge a criminal offense. 88
In 1980, Wendy Wickham presented to military authorities a
urine sample, purported to be hers, a test of which revealed that
the donor was seven weeks pregnant. In October, 1980, she was
discharged from active duty and placed in the Individual Ready
Reserve for the balance of her military commitment, which would
expire in April, 1984. In November, 1980, however, the Army
learned that Wickham had submitted the urine sample of another
woman and that Wickham was not and had not been pregnant. In
December, 1980, her discharge was revoked, and a violation of Ar-
ticle 83 was lodged against her. Following an unsuccessful petition
before the Court of Military Appeals, 89 she sought to enjoin the
court-martial in federal court. She was summarily denied relief.
A split panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
cision. From United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,390 the case in
which the Supreme Court had denied the military jurisdiction to
try by court-martial former service members for offenses commit-
ted while on active duty, the majority drew three factors upon
which military jurisdiction over discharged service members would
hinge. First, a court must determine whether the trial of the defen-
dant "would further the primary function of the military to fight
or be ready to fight wars, rather than the incidental purpose of
maintaining discipline within the service."39' This factor was re-
solved in favor of the military: "Fraudulent separation, like deser-
tion, places the power to thin the ranks of those ready for combat
in the hands of the soldier, not the service." '92
Second, the court examined whether the assertion of jurisdiction
over those situated similarly to Wickham would "sweep under mil-
itary jurisdiction a great number of persons not otherwise subject
to military law."3 93 The court discounted such a likelihood: "The
reach of Article 3(b) in this respect is minimal" inasmuch as it ap-
387. 10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1982).
388. Id. § 883.
389. 12 M.J. 145 (C.M.A. 1981).
390. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
391.-706 F.2d at 716 (citing Toth, 350 U.S. at 17, 22-23).
392. 706 F.2d at 716.
393. Id. (citing Toth, 350 U.S. at 19-20, 22-23).
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plies only to a narrow classification of individuals, those who have
fraudulently procured their discharge from active duty.39 4
Finally, the court determined that Article 3(b) was limited to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.3 95 The
statute is narrowly drawn and seeks only to enforce the service ob-
ligations of those who enlist in the armed forces. To the court, this
power was analgous to the "power to try and punish deserters;"
both had sought unlawfully to avoid their duties to the nation. In
the absence of a validly procured and executed discharge, Wick-
ham's military status and service obligation continued.3 9e
The Fifth Circuit was content to permit the military courts to
determine the merits of the case: "Despite the extreme examples
used by Justice Douglas in his scathing attack on 'so-called mili-
tary justice' in O'Callahan v. Parker,... military courts are not
Kafkaesque Star Chambers. They assume the same responsibility
to protect a person's constitutional rights as state and federal
courts. ' 397 Additionally, the court noted that the validity of the
discharge may be determined by a reading of Army regulations and
procedures. "Such matters fall within the special expertise of the
military courts. . . .We should defer to them in these respects. 3 98
Should Wickham ultimately be dissatisfied with the protection of
her constitutional rights in the military proceedings, she may com-
mence a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus in federal dis-
trict court.399
394. 706 F.2d at 716 (citing Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145, 151 (C.M.A. 1981)).
395. 706 F.2d at 716 (quoting Toth, 350 U.S. at 23) (emphasis in Toth).
396. 706 F.2d at 716-17.
397. Id. at 717 (citing O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 n.7 (1969)).
398. 706 F.2d at 717-18 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975)). The Fifth
Circuit appears to be less secure on this point. It appears that the key issues are questions
of fact, such as whether Wickham submitted the urine specimen of another, which a federal
court would be as competent as a military court to resolve. See 706 F.2d at 724 (Thornberry,
J., dissenting).
399. Judge Thornberry dissented, finding initially that to permit the military to deter-
mine even the threshold jurisdictional question would be to indulge in a presumption of
guilt. Wickham was ostensibly a civilian in possession of a valid discharge. In conferring
jurisdiction upon the military, Article 3(b) presumes that Wickham committed the act with
which she is charged; without the fraudulent procurement of the discharge, jurisdiction
would be lacking. 706 F.2d at 719-21 (Thomberry, J., dissenting). Judge Thornberry re-
solved all three Toth factors against the government. First, he found that Article 3(b) was
largely irrelevant to the military mission. Far from "thinning the ranks," fraudulently pro-
cured discharges had not been the basis for a prosecution in the more than thirty years of
operation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; Wickham was the first target. Id. at 722
(citing Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145, 156 (C.M.A. 1981) (Everett, C.J., dissenting)). Second,
Judge Thornberry charged that the majority had misread Toth. The evil of subjecting dis-
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Whether Wickham v. Hall will reach the Supreme Court is as
yet undetermined. If it does, a divided Court will probably affirm
the decision of the Fifth Circuit. Based on the philosophy of the
Burger Court toward the military apparent from the cases from
Relford to Chappell, however, it seems likely that the Court's
opinion will forego the initial analysis of the Fifth Circuit and will
focus instead upon the expertise of the military system and the
need for discipline.
The Court might begin its exposition by hearkening back to the
early military status cases, such as In re Grimley,0 ° for the pro-
position that enlistment in the military creates a status terminable
only by a valid discharge. Cases such as United States ex rel. Toth
v. Quarles40 1 would be distinguished, not cited for guidance. First,
for example, the discharge obtained by the accused in Toth was
unquestionably valid and served to sever all connection between
him and the military. In Wickham, however, the validity of the
discharge itself has been called into question. Second, given the
discussion in Chappell of the need to instill an unquestioning obe-
dience to orders in peacetime in order for service members to be
prepared to function effectively in wartime, the Burger Court
might take issue with the language in Toth that maintenance of
discipline was an "incidental" function of the military.40 2
The Burger Court, affording the military court system the same
prerogatives exercised by a federal district court, could allow the
court into which the accused is brought to determine in the first
instance whether jurisdiction over the person exists. Echoing vari-
ous passages from Schlesinger v. Councilman,0 3 the Court might
then permit the military justice system, at both trial and appellate
levels, to register its "expert" determination concerning the extent
to which the maintenance of discipline among active-duty service
members would depend upon the prosecution of one who had al-
charged service members to court-martial jurisdiction lies in the potential number of per-
sons affected, not in those actually affected. In this regard, the majority "places over the
head of every veteran a damoclean threat that, without a hearing, he may be seized by
military authorities to face trial by court-martial on the charge that his discharge was fraud-
ulently procured. The potential reach of Article 3(b) is enormous." 706 F.2d at 722. Finally,
whatever the military interest in the case, it could be adequately vindicated by a resolution
of the issue of fraud in the federal courts. Id. at 722-23.
400. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
401. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
402. Id. at 17.
403. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
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legedly procured a discharge fraudulently. Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit's equation of the fraudulent procurement of a discharge to de-
sertion might have been extreme, there is little doubt that a
majority of the Burger Court (possibly consisting of at least Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor), could find the impact upon military discipline and
readiness sufficient to warrant litigation of the claim, at least ini-
tially, through the military justice system.
VII. CONCLUSION
Times have changed. Just as the America of the Vietnam era is
not the America of the home computer age, so too, the Supreme
Court of Earl Warren and William 0. Douglas is not the Supreme
Court of Warren Burger and William Rehnquist. The Ameri-
can-and judicial-views of the role of the proper limitations upon
the military have changed. The litigiousness encouraged during the
Warren era has yielded to a deferential and prudential mindset in
the Burger era. Whatever the cause or causes, the Court has cho-
sen to accord the military criminal and administrative processes a
greater range of action than that granted by the latter-day Warren
Court. One might argue, however, hearkening back to Chief Justice
Warren's 1962 exposition,40 4 that this "hands off" approach had
been the tradition and that O'Callahan was an aberration. In
O'Callahan, tradition arguably yielded to the emotion of the mo-
ment, in a denigration of the military legal process. In any event,
particularly after Chappell v. Wallace, °5 the Supreme Court
seems to have chosen to follow the path delineated by Chief Jus-
tice Warren in 1962: That is, in the absence of a violation of the
fundamental rights of a service member, the military may control
its own personnel and installations. Those pursuing an expansion
of individual rights would be afforded no more; those seeking disci-
pline in the armed forces would be permitted no less.
404. Warren, supra note 353.
405. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
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